

The American Idea

DAVID ROHRER LEEPER



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THE AMERICAN IDEA

“Yet I doubt not thro’ the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widen’d with the process of the
suns.”

“Till the war-drum throb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were
furl’d
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.”



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THE AMERICAN IDEA

*Being a Short Study of the Tendency of Political
History, with Special Reference to the
Origin, Development, and Destiny of
the Federal-Republican Polity
of the United States*

By

DAVID ROHRER LEEPER

With Portrait

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

(By Hon. John B. Stoll, Veteran Newspaper Publisher and
Editor; a Long Time Friend and Intimate of
the Author)

THE author of this work was recognized among his acquaintances as a man of exceptionally large mental caliber, extraordinary capacity for profound thinking, and gifted with unusually strong reasoning powers. Had he been a man of less inherent modesty, more disposed to keep in the background than to hold the center of the stage, there is but little doubt that he could and would easily have won a commanding position in the councils of the nation. As a result of the application of well-directed persuasive powers by friends and admirers who were cognizant of his sterling qualities and his eminent fitness for public office, he did serve as a member of both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, as Mayor of the thriving city of South Bend, and later on as police commissioner of that municipality. Could he have been induced to countenance earnest entreaties for the acceptance of a congressional nomination, the nation would have had the benefit of his superior legislative capacity at

Washington. Overtures to make him Governor of Indiana were at times both urgent and persistent. But he withstood pressure in these directions with unshakable firmness. His love of literature and music, an irrepressible fondness for daily association with fellow-men in whom he had confidence and with whom he delighted to mingle, developed in his strong mind an unconquerable aversion to protracted severance of the ties of companionable fellowship. To devote himself to painstaking study, to the mastery of difficult problems, and to the production of some literary masterpiece, had seemingly become his supreme ambition. Thus actuated, and impelled by a laudable purpose to enable others to gain the benefit of his untiring study of governmental policies, he devoted himself assiduously to the preparation of the present work—*The American Idea*. Just how much time he devoted to its compilation, revision and final completion, he alone knew. Himself a thorough American, an earnest advocate of Right and Justice, and an uncompromising foe to sham and wrong, he rejoiced in the growth and development of The American Idea and freely gave himself over to the task of putting the thought in form for the convenience and benefit of his fellow-men.

The great value of this work lies to a great extent in the concise form in which it presents to the thoughtful reader an insight into the views and conclusions of the greatest thinkers and most philosophical minds of the present and past centuries, forming as it does a vista of governmental construction and destruction from time immemorial and setting up guide-posts for the future of our own nation, would we survive and be supreme, so far as our own interests and necessities are concerned.

To the analytical it is even more interesting than ordinarily to be found by study of political history, because it shows the mastery of mind that marked statesmanship in the past. In this practical age, when the occult is more humored than respected, it can well be wondered at that men of decades past should have been able to foresee and predict the very things that now hold the entire world in turmoil and torment, revising governments and territorial lines, turning autocracies into Republics, and converting monarchs into common citizens. That these prophecies could have been so accurately made should give a better understanding of the clear reasoning faculty and thinking power that made it possible for the builders of the American Republic

to create a form of government that has survived for more than a century, gaining strength with each generation that has enjoyed the benefit of its splendid service.

David Rohrer Leeper died Nov. 27, 1900, at the old Leeper homestead bordering on South Bend. The illness which proved his last, to a giant, rugged, courageous man who had undergone all the hardships of early pioneer life and crossed the plains with the Argonauts of '49 in the rush to the California gold fields, at the outset seemed trivial and hardly of serious import. But the relentless battler won, and quietly, in perfect harmony with his chosen habits of life, the vanquished passed beyond into the great unknown world—a severe loss to his family and intimates; a far greater loss to the culture and ennobling spirit of community life. The manuscript of *The American Idea* has been the cherished heritage of his surviving brother, Samuel Leeper, who, appreciating its value to those truly interested and concerned in the future of their country—native or adopted as may be,—has happily given consent to its publication.

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PREFACE

NOVELTY or originality has not been specially sought after as a feature of the present little volume. The aim throughout has been simply to present in a form as compact, convenient, and intelligible as possible what has appeared to me to be the most generally accepted facts and theories current on the several topics considered. To this end, a much more extensive list of authorities has been examined than would appear from the meagre results shown; and no scruple or hesitation has been felt in drawing literally and at length from such sources whenever it has been thought that the purpose in hand could be best subserved by so doing. In this way, the ablest specialists have been brought directly and forcefully to aid in the elucidation of the different phases of the subject investigated. The labor set apart for myself has been chiefly to select and collate the materials thus gleaned from rather numerous and widely scattered sources, and to endeavor to put these together into a readable, consistent,

and perspicuous whole. How far I have fallen short in the undertaking, I am sure that no one can more fully realize than myself. As to the spirit in which the work is conceived, it borders on neither extreme. If I have apprehended the import of the phenomena dealt with aright, the preponderance of facts, in spite of what may appear to the contrary, points to the conclusion that the tendency of man and of society is, upon the whole, not backward but forward; and that, with respect to popular government as illustrated in "The American Idea," we have equally good reason to look with satisfaction upon the present, and to cherish a hopeful view as to the future.

D. R. L.

SOUTH BEND, IND.

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THE GENESIS OF POPULAR POWER



THE AMERICAN IDEA

I.

THE GENESIS OF POPULAR POWER.

THE idea of progress, which is the chief underlying characteristic of the federal-republican polity, is pointed out as among the rarest phenomena of human history. Progress, in greater or less degree, there has been indeed among every known people; but, at the same time, the stationary state is a conspicuous fact that holds true of by far the larger part of the human race. Nations have stuck at almost every step of the gradient from the lower stages of savagery upward. Even at this moment there remains, as Mr. Lecky phrases it, "so great a diversity among existing nations that traversing tracts of space is almost like traversing tracts of time, for it brings us in contact with living representatives of nearly every phase of past civilization." But the usual point of arrest, as Sir Henry Maine has remarked, is at that period of development where legal codes first appear enshrined

in written language. "It is indisputable," to quote the words of this excellent authority, "that much the greater part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by their embodiment in some permanent record." * This singular phenomenon is explainable, partly at least, from the circumstance that to the primitive mind nothing is more loathed and dreaded than improvement or change, and it is obvious that codification conserved this deep-seated prepossession; for the laws being engraven on tablets and exposed to public view, the people were enabled from their knowledge of what the law was the better to resist attempts at innovation and reform.

The Greeks stand out as the first people of history to get over this formidable stumbling-block. Here the rise of a healthful, vigorous intellectual and philosophic cast of mind began at an early date to supersede and dispel the mythical and superstitious predilection which hitherto had universally blunted and palsied

* This theory of the development of popular influence set forth in this paper will be found fully elaborated by Sir Henry S. Maine in his *Ancient Law*, from which this passage is quoted.

every impulse to progress or to liberty. The Stoic philosophy was one of the notable fruits of this advance from the era of faith to the era of reason, and marks an epoch of incalculable importance in the trend of civilization thenceforward. But for this incident, it is believed that Western Aryan society, instead of having reached its present splendid heights in its advances toward perfection, might still be lingering in that same dreary, rigid state that has been the hapless lot of their Asiatic ethnic kindred from time immemorial. The essential tenet of Stoicism with which we are here concerned was "the assertion of the existence of a bond of unity among mankind which transcended or annihilated all class or national distinctions," and which it was the end of philosophy to recognize and to conform to. This tenet was the bottom principle of the Roman *jus naturale*, and, through the thorough coalescence of the Stoical method with the Roman jurisprudence which eventually took place, this conception of a law of nature led to most momentous consequences, opening up, as it did, an exhaustless field for social and ethical speculation, and clearing the way for all subsequent human advancement.

It is to this conception of a law of nature that

we owe, among other things, the grand maxim laid down by the Roman *jurisconsults* as early as the third century of our era, that, "as far as natural law is concerned, all men are equal . . . all men are born free." This doctrine in its early acceptation bore only a legal or juridical significance; but, as time went on, it logically and practically yielded all important political and ethical results. It led, in the first place, to the supplanting of the primitive patriarchal notion of kinship as the bond of political union to that of geographical or territorial contiguity—a change of sentiment and method which alone made the modern state possible. It also did much more: As modified and extended successively through the enlightened and liberal speculations of Milton, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Jefferson, the *jus naturale* came finally to receive its best and highest expression as we find it formulated in our Declaration of Independence and in the institutions and laws of our Republic. To this same source also, are we to look for the birth and inspiration of those vast political, social, and industrial movements which, beginning with the Reformation, have since exerted such a prodigious influence in accelerating the growth and diffusion of democratic ideas throughout the Western Aryan world.

POLITICS AND RELIGION

II.

POLITICS AND RELIGION.

IN what has just been said of the evolution of the fundamental conceptions of popular government, it will have been noticed that only secular agencies have been taken into account. This exposition of the subject would, obviously, appear quite incomplete in view of the important claims which are so frequently and confidently put forth for religion in the same behalf. Some reference, therefore, to the connection between religion and politics is called for before passing from this branch of our inquiry.

The religious impulse, or what answers to the religious impulse, is said to be universal among mankind. In the earlier stages of culture, this sentiment enters into and dominates all the concerns of life. Religion, law, and politics are blended together as one. The heads of the religion are generally the heads of the State. All authority is assumed to be of direct divine commission. In ancient Greece, as we have seen, society was first enabled to free itself from the yoke imposed by this order of things and to start

upon the high-road of progress. Religion there had no doubt subserved a happy purpose in the furtherance of civilization up to a certain stage; but the time came when the gods of the Pantheon lost their charm, and the God of Nature was enthroned in their stead. A somewhat analogous movement occurred among the Teutonic races in modern times. Most authorities agree that, up to the time of the revival of letters, the ecclesiastical influence had been, in the main, favorable to general progress; but here again a period arrived when the horizon which the hierarchy had circumscribed about itself became too narrow and unyielding for the vigorous, expansive movements which its own efforts had incidentally been largely instrumental in setting in motion. Thenceforward the notion of direct divine interposition in temporal affairs has been gradually losing its force in the public mind until it has come to be almost wholly eschewed in the formulas of law and politics both in Europe and America. Indeed, since the dawn of "the age of reason in the West," it is to the philosophic and rationalistic influence, and generally in spite of the sacerdotal, that we are to look for the inspiration and energizing principle of those gigantic

political and intellectual forces which, in the latter part of the last century, so happily culminated in the grand social upheaval which gave to the American colonies their independence and to mankind the best fruits of the French Revolution.

Where the religious type of character is pronounced, resistance to change is the chief social trait. It is usually the habit of ecclesiastics to speak of religion "as ready-made from the beginning, as perfect in all its parts because revealed of God, and if liable to corruption, at all events incapable of improvement."* The logical effect of such a mental state or attitude, especially where it dominates all the details and

* Advanced religious ideas, however, show undoubted signs of improvement—not in religion itself, but in religious *ideas*. H. H. Bancroft (*History of Utah*, 333) well states the facts in the following passage: "As the Christian world has advanced in civilization and intelligence these two thousand years or so, it has gradually left behind a little and a little more of its religion, first of the tenets of the Hebraic record, and then somewhat even of those of the later dispensation. Long before religionists began to question as myths the stories of Moses, and Jonah, and Job, they had thrown aside as unseemly blood-sacrifice and burnt-offerings, sins of uncleanness, the stoning of sabbath-breakers, the killing in war of women, children, and prisoners, the condemnation of whole nations to perpetual bondage, and many other revolting customs of the half-savage Israelites sanctioned by holy writ. This they did of their own accord, not because they were

minutiæ of life, would be to impress the same conservatism upon the lineaments of civilization generally; and, as a matter of fact, such is the legitimate and inevitable outcome, as we may see fully illustrated in the melancholy history and seemingly hopeless fate of those swarming hordes of the human race that people the great continents of Asia and Africa. In mediæval Europe the same tranced and passive social condition is witnessed. "A theological system," says Mr. Lecky, "had lain like an incubus upon Christendom, and to its influence, more than to any other single cause, the universal paralysis is to be ascribed." * Proof of this fact abounds. We have room here only for the bare mention of three or four typical illustrations. We read, for

so commanded, but in spite of commandments, and by reason of a higher and more refined culture—a culture which had outgrown the cruder dogmas of the early ages. Then came the putting away of slavery and polygamy, the former but recently permitted in these American states, and the latter being here even now. Among the discarded customs taught and encouraged by the new testament are, speaking in tongues, going forth to preach without purse or scrip, laying on of hands for the healing of the sick, raising the dead, casting out devils, and all other miracles; and there will be further repudiations as time passes, further ignoring of portions of the scriptures by orthodox sects, a further weeding out of the unnatural and irrational from things spiritual and worshipful."—See also Max Müller, *Science of Religion*, 126; Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, 173.

* Lecky, *Rationalism in Europe*, i. 280.

instance, that, "when in the middle of the eighth century an Irish saint, named St. Virgilius, . . . ventured in Bavaria to assert the existence of the Antipodes, the whole religious world was thrown into a paroxysm of indignation, St. Boniface heading the attack, and Pope Zackary, at least for a time, encouraging it." * Finally navigators sailed for the Antipodes, and the false theological conception had then of course to be abandoned. Again: "On the 24th of February, 1616, the consulting theologians of the Holy office characterized the two propositions—that the sun is immovable in the centre of the world, and that the earth has a diurnal motion of rotation—the first as 'absurd in philosophy and formally heretical, because contrary to the Holy Scripture,' and the second as 'open to the same censure in philosophy, and at least erroneous as to faith.'" Because of his espousal of this Copernican theory, which the discoveries of Kepler, Newton, and others soon compelled everybody to believe, Galileo was incarcerated by order of a court of ecclesiastics and compelled under threat of torture to recant. The same narrow and repressive spirit was shown by the exceedingly ungracious temper in which the

* See article "Galileo," *Ency. Brit.*

head of the Church regarded the granting of Magna Charta. Says Dr. Draper on this point: "The wrath of the pontiff knew no bounds when he learned that the Great Charter had been conceded. In his bull he denounced it as base and ignominious; he anathematized the king if he observed it; he declared it null and void. It was not the policy of the Roman court to permit so much as the beginnings of such freedom." * Religious persecution, with its long train of unspeakable horrors, is a terrible count in the same indictment. The utter stamping out of all freedom of conscience and freedom of worship, rights which the framers of our government were so careful to intrench in the Constitution, and which we now prize as of the very essence of popular liberty, was the sole inspiring motive for the fiendish atrocities which were thus perpetrated in the name of Christianity.

All this, however, is not saying that mankind is not much indebted to Christianity as taught and practiced for the advancement of civilization and of good government; though it must, nevertheless, be confessed that in this case, as happens in many other cases, benefits often came about in ways least expected and least desired. Prof.

* *Intellectual Development of Europe*, ii. 54.

John Fiske, in his small but clever and instructive work, *The Beginnings of New England*, tells how the straight-laced, bigoted Puritans of Massachusetts thus, by the unexpected turn of events, builded better than they knew, helping along, as they did materially, though unconsciously, the progress toward free conscience, free thought, and free government. These devoted though somewhat misguided Christians, in casting their fortunes in the New World, set out intent upon the establishment and perpetuation of a pure theocracy, but ended up by finding themselves, in spite of themselves, drifted into a purely secular republic. A similar course of things happened with the Church in the Middle Ages. The absolute equality of every human being before God was a doctrine which the early Christians inculcated with a zeal and enthusiasm that only an intense, all-engrossing conviction could inspire. "For the master and the slave," they proclaimed, "there was one law and one hope, one baptism, one Savior, one Judge." But, as from the time of Constantine onward the Church was usually found allied with the imperial secular power, it is reasonable to infer that, in propagating the notion of equality in things spiritual, the priesthood had no thought or

intention of opening the door to the extension of the same principle to things temporal. Yet such without doubt was the logical and practical effect. By parity of reasoning, ideas of equality in one thing would beget ideas of equality in other things. And no doubt such process of reasoning did, in the end, contribute much toward preparing the way for the conception and acceptance of those broad views of natural rights and natural justice which came at last to be acknowledged as among the rudimentary principles of civil government.

A further incident fraught with important results attended the rise of Christianity. To the Pagan mind, ethics was a principle of philosophy; while to the Christian mind, it was a principle of religion. Through the former method, the influence of ethical teaching did not come into close touch with the masses; while through the latter method, such influence was brought within the reach of all. Dr. Draper, in his terse and vivid phrase, has described how through the Mediæval Ages this blending of the moral and the religious gave "rise to numberless blessings in spite of the degradation and wickedness of man." Entering into detail, this luminous

and learned writer proceeds to draw the following graphic picture:

“The ideas of an ultimate accountability for personal deeds, of democratic instincts, were often found to be the inflexible supporters of right against might. Eventually coming to be the depositaries of the knowledge that then existed, they opposed intellect to brute force, in many instances successfully, and by the example of the organization of the Church, which was essentially republican, they showed how representative systems may be introduced into the State. Nor was it over communities and nations that the Church displayed her chief power. Never in the world before was there such a system. From her central seat at Rome, her all-seeing eye, like that of Providence itself, could equally take in a hemisphere at a glance, or examine the private life of any individual. Her boundless influences enveloped kings in their palaces, and relieved the beggar at the monastery gate. In all Europe there was not a man too obscure, too insignificant, or too desolate for her. Surrounded by her solemnities, every one received his name at her altar; her bells chimed at his marriage, her knell tolled at his funeral. She extorted from him the secrets of his life at her confessionals, and punished his faults by her penances. In his hour of sickness and trouble her servants sought him out, teaching him by her exquisite litanies and prayers, to place his reliance on God, or strengthening him for the trials of life by the example of the holy and just. Her prayers had an efficacy to give repose to the souls of his dead. When, even to his

friends, his lifeless body had become an offense, in the name of God she received it into her consecrated ground, and under her shadow he rested till the great reckoning-day. From little better than a slave she raised his wife to be his equal, and forbidding him to have more than one, met her recompense for those noble deeds in a firm friend at every fireside. Discountenancing all impure love, she put round that fireside the children of one mother, and made that mother little less than sacred in their eyes. In ages of lawlessness and rapine, among people but a step above savages, she vindicated the inviolability of her precincts against the hand of power, and made her temples a refuge and sanctuary for the despairing and oppressed. Truly she was the shadow of a great rock in many a weary land!" *

Here again it certainly could have been little prevised or suspected by these religious devotees that in the work to which they had thus consecrated their lives, they were planting the seeds of "the great rebellion of the laity against the priesthood," to which, in the words of Macaulay, we are chiefly indebted "for political and intellectual freedom, and for all the blessings which political and intellectual freedom have brought in their train." Indeed, little more than a hundred years have elapsed since men's eyes anywhere became fully opened to the fact that "political and intellectual freedom" is entirely

* *Physiology*, bk. ii, ch. viii.

compatible with a proper conception of the interests of the Church and of the cause of sound religion.

It will have been noted that much that in the above passage from Dr. Draper is credited to Christian teaching and Christian ministrations in the Middle Ages, is still a part of the Christian office and the Christian work. Especially is such the case with respect to what in the same connection the writer says of the fact that the civil law exerts an "exterior power in human relations," while Christianity produces, or is calculated to produce, "an interior or moral change." A very wide range of human activities, we know, falls within a region which the State never attempts to enter or to control. For example: "A man may be a bad husband, a bad father, a bad guardian, without coming into conflict with the rules of a single law. He may be an extortionate landlord, a wasteful tenant, a hard dealer." It is perhaps a fact, humiliating as it may seem,* that the fear of eternal damnation, quite as much as the love of God and the

* An idea tersely and lucidly brought out by Prof. William Hoynes, Dean of the law department in the University of Notre Dame, in an article entitled *What the Law Is*, which recently appeared in the *Law Journal of Chicago* and *The Scholastic*, Notre Dame.

hope of future bliss, acts as a powerful motive to proper conduct, and thus indirectly subserves the law.

It is not contended, indeed, that Christianity is alone the keeper and educator of man's moral nature; for we find that high standards of moral culture were evolved long ages before the Christian era and among nations which, for aught we know, were in total ignorance as to even the Mosaic code. Great minds through all the preceding ages had been finding out, by means of their consciousness, their observation, and their experience, what best conduces to harmony, peace, purity, beauty, love, self-denial; and these æsthetic and utilitarian elements, which were scattered along through many centuries and among many peoples, these superior men gathered together and framed into maxims and proverbs to serve as standards of conduct for the individual and for society. In the same direction are we to seek the source of our religious ideas. They are simply a growth from human consciousness and human experience, and are subject to precisely the same evolutionary modifications.* The wide diversity in religious beliefs

* See Beecher's *Evolution and Religion*, where this theory is somewhat fully worked out.

in all ages of the world and the material modifications which scientific discoveries and the general advance of intelligence have produced in religious dogmas and religious interpretation should be enough to satisfy us upon this point. Religion, as we see it and as we know it, must necessarily always be in greater or less degree contaminated with the imperfections of human nature through which medium it appears to us, and cannot therefore represent a positive truth, or afford an infallible guide for conduct.*

But what is here meant and what is here insisted upon is that Christianity is a part and an important part of that general scheme of the unfoldment of nature's laws, the tendency of which is, upon the whole, to elevate the character and increase the comfort and happiness of the human race. So long, therefore, as those whose special mission it is to expound and diffuse Christian doctrine confine their efforts to the cultivation and refinement of the spiritual and moral nature and susceptibilities, such efforts are to be respected, lauded, encouraged. But when these agencies attempt to reach out beyond this wholesome, legitimate sphere, and to arrogate to

* For very sensible observations on which see Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, ch. vii.

themselves the control of the legal and political machinery of the State, they are trenching upon forbidden ground, and essaying an interference which, in the present temper of the public mind, the jealous, quickened sense of the advanced society of our day, and especially of our country, would speedily and effectually resent.

ANGLO-SAXON PROGRESSIVENESS

III.

ANGLO-SAXON PROGRESSIVENESS — DECLINE OF DEMOCRATIC UTOPIANISM.

IN the march of progressive civilization during the last two or three hundred years the Anglo-Saxon* (or English-speaking) race claims to have held the foremost rank among the peoples of the earth. As Dr. Lieber has put it: "We belong to the Anglican tribe, which carries Anglican principles and liberty over the globe, because, wherever it moves, liberal institutions and a common law full of manly rights and instinct, with the principle of an expansive life, accompany it. We belong to that race whose obvious task it is, among other proud and sacred tasks, to rear and spread civil liberty over vast regions in every part of the earth, on continent and isle. We

* Some writers, notably E. A. Freeman and John Fiske, have discarded the appellation *Anglo-Saxon* as not being properly applicable to the English-speaking peoples; but I have retained it herein for the reason that we have no other term to express the thought without resorting to circumlocution. The word *Saxon* is also used for the same purpose, for the sake of euphony, as in *Slav and Saxon*.

belong to that tribe which alone has the word Self-Government."

This race, though now widely dispersed over the globe and working out its destiny under different flags, has yet enough of racial homology existing throughout its several branches to be considered one people so far as our present purpose is concerned. Taken in such totality, this race already comprises one-fifteenth of the whole human family, rules over four times as many more, possesses one-third of the earth's surface and owns over one-third of the world's wealth. Besides, this "race is multiplying not only more rapidly than any other European race, but far more rapidly than *all* the races of continental Europe. . . . It is not unlikely that before the close of the next century this race will outnumber all the other civilized races of the world." Along with this phenomenal progress in population and material possessions, there has gone an equally rapid advancement in the "spread of civil liberty" and in the emancipation of thought in every department of rational inquiry. Thus, through the curious shiftings in the evolution of history, what was begun at Athens, the "mother of art and eloquence," has in the course of many centuries found its broader and more perfect

development in London and Washington, the centers of modern life and empire.

The consciousness of such prestige has not always served to inspire us of Anglo-Saxon descent with an excess of modesty. John Bull's stock-boast that the sun never sets upon his dominions, and Brother Jonathan's ideal "Yan-keedom" stretching from pole to pole and from rising to setting sun, are familiar instances in point. A like overweening conceit has been indulged with respect to our political tenets.

The twin gospels of Liberty and Equality had long been the cherished dream of the political optimist. Milton and Locke had sung their praises. Later, Montesquieu and Rousseau immensely popularized them. Our experiment, however, stands out as the first actual attempt to put such conception to practical test as the central fact of a nation's civil and political polity. Hamilton, Gerry, and Sherman gravely doubted. Franklin, Jefferson and Wilson were confident. Happily, the sentiment of the people at large was on the side of the latter, and the result, finally, was that the new dogma came to be accepted with an eagerness and enthusiasm which often bordered well-nigh upon fanaticism. Great Britain was more tardy in imbibing the

spirit; but there, too, democracy has silently but steadily grown and spread till it has become triumphant. Reform bill after Reform bill has been passed in answer to the repeated and increasing popular demands, until it has come to be aptly said of the British Constitution that, "A Republic has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a Monarchy."

This progressive tendency as yet shows little sign of abatement. Nor is it at all likely greatly to lag till the entire world has felt its touch and succumbed to its power. It is quite obvious, however, that the glow and fervor which once attended the movement are no longer present. Political thought, partaking of the general critical and judicial temper of the time, has been forced to abandon the sentimental and visionary for the severely real and practical. Indeed, the reaction in not a few cases has gone so far as to betray an indifference, if not an actual aversion, toward the popular political and social proclivities of the race and of the age. In our own country, the close of the Civil War seems to mark the beginning of this era of decadence in "gush," if not in patriotism and reason. The pyrotechnic Fourth of July orator of *ante bellum* times has since been notable from his

absence. Fervid apostrophes to "The Constitution" and "The Flag" now no longer charm the ear and move the heart as of old. Many of the evils which were thought to be peculiar to the Old World and to monarchical rule we are astonished to see creeping in amongst us. Grasping, conscienceless monopolies, it is seen, multiply and wax fat in the land. Strikes, lock-outs, and the like are almost constant spectacles, and not infrequently culminate in riot and bloodshed. The tramp, it is pointed out, has come among us, and come seemingly to stay; and we have even felt it prudent or necessary upon occasion to "make an example" of a few of the more pestiferous characters that were thought to be menacing our social order. While we have no royalty, no aristocracy, no established church, no law of entail or of primogeniture, we are yet twitted with having the "upper ten and lower ten thousand," all the same. Even the fundamental conceptions — the famous so-called "self evident" "truths"— upon which our social fabric was founded, no longer pass unchallenged. For instance, Dr. Hosmer, an able American author, in a recent elaborate work, flatly asserts that "few things are plainer" than that the idea of liberty and the idea of equality rigidly exclude

one another; "that liberty is the necessary source of inequality, and that equality can only be secured and maintained by a tyranny whose first law is the denial of all individual freedom." On the other side of the water, Stephen, Maine, Mallock, Griffin, and other widely-read authors argue to the same purport. Justice Stephen, the eminent English jurist and law-writer, is especially pronounced in this direction. Like Macaulay, he utterly scouts Mill's generally accepted notions of popular liberty, and bluntly tells us that "popular institutions, as we know them, . . . by no means deserve that blind admiration and universal applause with which they are usually received." In his opinion, "real substantial inequalities — inequalities of talent, of education, of sentiment, of religious belief, and therefore of the most binding of all obligations — never were so great as at the present moment. I doubt much," he adds, "whether the power of particular persons over their neighbors has ever in any age of the world been so well defined and so easily and safely exerted as at present." Little wonder, therefore, that, amid such reeking doubt and disbelief, the now baroneted bard of *Locksley Hall*, turning his back upon his earlier and nobler instincts, should no longer discourse

in serenely flowing numbers of "the thoughts of men" widening with "the process of the suns." Rather should we expect the morbid, petulant outbursts of the cynic of *Sixty Years After*:

"Do your best to charm the worst, to lower the rising race of men;
Have we risen out of the beast, then back into the beast again?"

The problems which are vexing us on this side of the Atlantic, we hardly need be told, are pressing with no less force and persistency our kinsfolk beyond. Indeed, if we may give credence to the general out-givings from that quarter, much more troublesome ailments are at present plaguing the United Kingdom than are plaguing the United States. To begin with, the Irish complications seem to be growing all the while from bad to worse, and to be possible of termination only in the independence or in the depopulation of Ireland. Then the colonial relations of England are becoming far from comforting to her contemplation. These dependencies, it is seen, are making rapid progress in all the elements essential to an independent political autonomy. If there ever was a necessity — as there doubtless was — for these

communities being attached to the Crown, that necessity, it is also seen, is rapidly passing away, if indeed it has not already gone by. The fact cannot have escaped the reader of the current discussions of the colonial question, that the American and Australasian British provinces are now riper and better equipped for setting up business on their own account than were the original British colonies of America when separation from the mother country was first seriously agitated. While loyalty to the Queen is still with every Englishman unquestionably a religiously cherished sentiment, it is yet plain enough that the colonial situation is becoming an extremely critical one. So generally is this understood, that not a few of the recognized leaders of public opinion in Great Britain are repeatedly and strenuously urging that a recasting of the British Constitution is a paramount necessity, if the integrity of the Empire is to be maintained.* If something be not devised, and devised soon, in the way of a "United British Empire" or some other similar scheme to bring about a closer union of the Central Government

* For discussions of this topic see Mr. Froude's writings. Also *The Nineteenth Century*, Jan. and Feb. 1885, and *The Forum*, Nov. 1888.

and its outlying parts, it is feared, and for good reason, that the widely-scattered provinces, upon the first adverse turn of events, might take it into their heads to pattern after the suggestive American example of 1776. Such process of dismemberment once begun, it is easy to imagine that it could not be stayed till the "Mistress of the Seas" might herself be blotted from the map of nations.



**SAXON OR SLAV — LIBERTY OR
DESPOTISM**



IV.

SAXON OR SLAV—LIBERTY OR DESPOTISM.

ANOTHER occasion for solicitude, and one involving the destiny not only of the “Sceptred Isle” but of all Anglosaxondom, is coming to be discussed with increasing interest and frequency by the graver class of the periodicals and speakers of the day. The following excerpt from the London *Spectator* of July 4, 1885, though originally appearing in a somewhat different connection, will serve in part to illustrate what is here meant:

“In 1984, when the world contains a thousand millions of white faces, six hundred millions of these will be English and Germans, and three hundred millions will be Slav. There will practically be no other white races, the French not increasing, the Spaniards increasing slowly—if, indeed, as in Mexico, they do not rather suffer absorption into a dark people; the Scandinavian having stopped absolutely; and the Irishman, true to his destiny, helping only to swell the power of the race he professes to detest. If the Teuton and the Slav can keep friends, the world is theirs; and if not, there will be the most terrible struggle recorded in history since the white barbarians fought the white Romans

and their darker allies. We are not sure that an agreement is possible until a great fight has taken place, for Slav and Teuton seem unwilling to comprehend each other, though there is not between them the internecine hatred sometimes observed in history; but if their statesmen could arrange terms on which the conflict could be permanently avoided, a huge mass of misery might be saved to our immediate descendants. To avoid the quarrel will be difficult, for the Slav is just now strangled; and to reach the open water, and so take his natural part in the greater movement of mankind, he must pitch himself on somebody, be it on Turkey, or England, or China; but the means of avoidance are worth the study and patience of years. Mankind is not very likely to be happy when all is done, for in all this movement is no cure for sin, or pain, or poverty; anxiety increases as fast as intelligence, and sympathy—which means suffering—faster than strength; but one grand condition of even moderate well-being is that Slav and Teuton should learn how to live together in peace. If not, the Teuton may some day—in less than a century—find that every third white man is a foe, and that the third man has the power of ranging behind him the darker races of mankind. The Teuton has the art of dominance; but the Slav has gained a strong hold wherever he has ruled, and can do at least one thing we cannot,—he can conquer the Turanian without rousing his unquenchable hate. Now, the Turanian is the only race not white which should in 1984 be strong.”


What figure will the Colossus of the Antipodes (China) cut in the coming evolution of nations?

Later speculations on the subject reduce the conditions of the problem to still greater simplicity than *The Spectator* has here given it. For instance, according to Mr. Foulke, in his recent thoughtful little volume entitled *Slav and Saxon*, England and Russia, representing respectively the Saxon and the Slav, are the coming colossal powers which are to be pitted against each other in this stupendous conflict. These nations, as everybody knows, have long been far from bosom friends. For years their Asiatic borders have been the source of constant irritation and quarrel between them; and somewhere upon this disputed territory, it is predicted that the initial battle will be fought. "Let India fall," reasons Mr. Foulke, "and Russia is assured the dominion of a continent." But would a continent indeed satisfy Russia's lust of dominion, sharpened and intensified, as in that event it would be, from the flush of victory and the glory of conquest? "Our (American) interests in this question," as the same writer suggests, "seem to be very remote. We are so far from the scene of the conflict that it looks as though its consequences would never reach us. But if the great Eastern World, containing almost the whole population of the globe,

should become subjected to the iron yoke of military rule, would it stop there? Would there be any limit to the aggressions of despotism?" The formidable and rapidly growing power and prestige of the Muscovite is certainly a matter not to be lightly and flippantly set aside. Already clutching in his iron grasp more than a sixth of the habitable globe, and boasting a population almost a third as great as that of all Europe outside of his own European dominions, this crafty, eager, aggressive autocrat is coming more and more to be regarded as a standing menace to Western civilization. When, again, we take into account his adroitness in appropriating and centralizing power, and his amazing tact and facility in absorbing and assimilating the vast Turanian and Mongolian hordes upon his Asiatic borders, his attitude and his movements would seem to become with still greater emphasis matters of grave and portentous concern.

Now this pessimistic view of the situation is certainly far from gratifying to Anglo-Saxon pride and aspiration. Nor is it to be denied that there is much in the outlook presented that demands a vigilant, sagacious statesmanship, and the constant, active, zealous regard of an enlight-

ened and patriotic people. The picture, however, upon closer scrutiny is found not to be without its better and brighter side. First, take the dangers alleged to be menacing us from Russian aggression. Attention to a few salient facts will, we think, go far toward removing any apprehension of probable peril from that quarter. The Russian system is, to begin with, almost wholly alien and external. It is a despotism distinctively after the oriental type. Its chief function is tax-gathering and tax-consuming. No connecting link or bond of unity is found between the ruling class and the subject class—no community of interest, of sympathy, of aspiration, or of ideas. Once lift the pressure imposed from above and the Empire must instantly crumble into its original constituents. Again, few, if any, usages, rights, or guaranties exist which the Czar is bound to respect. In theory, and, for the most part in fact, the imperial will is the law. There are, therefore, no sure props to lean upon, no common heritages to cherish, nothing to stimulate patriotism, nothing to cement the society, nothing to impart to the body politic the life, the strength, the unity, the consistency, the homogeneity of a true organic whole. Anglo-Saxon society, on the other hand,



is self-constructive, self-poised, self-recuperative, self-perpetuating. Coercion has little part either in its structure or in its functions. It springs spontaneously from beneath and from within, and is not forcibly imposed from above or from without. It is a composite body — a “plural unit”—made up chiefly of forms and organisms which Dr. Lieber has styled “institutions,” and which, in his *Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, he insists at length and with convincing logic are of the spirit and essence of free government and the strongest surety for its well-being and preservation. These institutions may be enumerated as the trial by jury, the habeas corpus, the right of petition, the immunity from unlawful search and seizure, the principle of local self-government, the common law, the public school, the freedom of speech and of worship, together with the various other fundamental principles, usages, and ideas which we observe in regular operation as constituent parts of our social organism. Supplementing and reinforcing the general or public agencies, are the thousand and one religious, benevolent, commercial, educational, and other extra-political associations or bodies. Many of these institutions have a long and eventful history of their

own, and have been wrought out at great cost of brain, and toil, and blood; but have now become so firmly rooted into the organic life, and are so closely intertwined one with another and each with all, that, we are sure, no possible shock or strain either from without or from within can ever seriously harm, much less wholly destroy, the general structure. Indeed, were it possible to strike down the outer framework to-day, we are confident that these inner forces would rebuild it to-morrow.* These marked characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon explain why through all his otherwise checkered history, the growth and development of his institutions and his distinctive individuality have nowhere or at any time met with long or serious check or interruption. With us of America, even the strain of the Civil

* "There is nothing that more forcibly strikes a person arriving for the first time from the European continent, either in the United States or in England, than the thousand-fold evidences of an all-pervading associative spirit in all moral and practical spheres, from the almost universal commercial copartnerships and associations, the 'exchanges' of artisans, and banks, to those unofficial yet national associations which rise to real grandeur. Strike out from England or America this feature and principle, and they are no longer the same self-relying, energetic, indomitably active people. The spirit of self-government would be gone. In France, an opposite spirit prevails."—*Civ. Lib. and Self-Gov.* i. 147.

War, intense and long-protracted as it was, seemed to accelerate rather than to retard the country's onward career, and, what is more, to have added still brighter luster to the name and prestige of free institutions and free government the world over. We remember indeed that for a time after President Lincoln's assassination there was much discussion as to the necessity of keeping a "strong man" at the helm of State; and we remember also that when President Garfield lay in a critical state from the effects of Guiteau's bullet, many well-meaning persons became much concerned lest the death of the Chief Magistrate, should it happen, might precipitate general disaster and ruin upon the country. Such apprehensions, let us trust, betray the want of a true conception of the genius and structure of Anglo-Saxon society, and especially of the genius and structure of American society. For, verily, the greatest and most illustrious of our statesmen and heroes will come and go in the future, as they have come and gone in the past, producing little more effect upon the current of public events than if here a bubble had blown and there a bubble burst.

As to the practical aspects of the competing systems -- the autocratical and the popular -- a

like disparity appears. According to James Wilson, the eminent statesman and jurist of our national constitution-making period, the advantages of the monarchic form "are strength, despatch, secrecy, unity of council"; and from similar impressions the notion has gotten abroad that under such government, the supervision being more immediate and direct, a closer and stricter accountability, and accordingly a purer and more efficient administrative service, is attainable than where the public authority is less centralized. But the Russian example, wherein such centralization has been carried to its fullest logical results, does not by any means warrant that assumption. So far from it, it is said that corruption and peculation in office in that country are so rife and so glaring that it has come to be a popular proverb among the common people that "Christ himself would steal were his hands not nailed to the cross." The monstrous and persistent exactions and abuses of power and privilege which under this system find a place are most deplorable indeed in their effects upon the common people. The reader of Stepniak's lurid pages on *The Russian Peasantry* can scarcely conceive of a more impoverished, wretched, hapless condition than that to which this class, which

constitutes the bulk of the Russian masses, has been from this cause reduced. The liberation of the serf in that far-away region, we remember, was hailed as a signal triumph of the cause of popular liberty, and long and loud were the praises to Alexander throughout Christendom for his generous, righteous deed. Yet, as the matter has turned out, that act has proved itself to have been premature and ill-advised; for the stubborn fact confronts us that the condition of the emancipated classes has since their freedom steadily grown from bad to worse. When in serfdom, the *moujik* (peasant) did enjoy certain recognized rights in the soil he cultivated; but, under the squeezing process since systematically pursued, he has become the helpless, pitiable prey to the most grinding species of agrarianism ever known to history. Among much other even more startling details, the author above quoted says: "As to the impoverishment of the masses measured by the reduced consumption of food and the increased rate of mortality it is frightful and intense, and shows no signs of abatement. . . . The bulk of our peasantry are in a condition not far removed from actual starvation—a fact which can neither be denied nor concealed by the official press." William E. Curtis and

other competent and trustworthy authorities who speak from personal observation and experience, fully corroborate this astounding tale of woe. Could the average Anglo-Saxon ever be reduced to such an abject condition? We shall fain believe that the time has long gone by, if indeed it ever existed, when such a thing could be considered within the list of possible results.

And now, lastly, as to what are the probabilities in this connection considered from an evolutionary point of view. Frederic Harrison, in a recent magazine article on the Revolution of 1789, describes that critical period in the history of France as, in its inmost spirit and normal manifestation, "an organic evolution. It was a movement," he proceeds to say, "in no sense local, accidental, temporary, or partial; it was not simply, nor even mainly, a political movement. It was an intellectual and religious, a moral, social, and economic movement before it was a political movement. . . . It was not an episode in the life of a single nation. In all its deeper elements it is a condensation of the history of mankind, a repertory of all social and political problems." This movement, thus so vigorously described, is in essence and historical sequence identical with that which is impelling

the Western Aryan races forward in their courses to-day, only that now such movement, under the ripening and softening influence of advancing thought, is freed from that delirium and wanton ferocity which were its revolting accompaniments a hundred years ago. The same active, aggressive spirit and tendency are certain, as we feel, to attend and control the advancing dominance of the white man as his rule and occupancy overspread the earth. This sublime movement the autocrat by the "sacred Neva" can no more resist than King John could resist the demands of the barons at Runnymede; no more than Charles I. could resist the outcry for parliamentary supremacy as opposed to royal pretensions; no more than Louis XVI. could resist the "ideas of '89," which swept away the last relics of feudalism in France; no more than George III. could resist the achievement of American independence; no more than the "slave power" of our own generation could resist the destruction of negro slavery in this country, where it was held by its votaries to exist by virtue of constitutional as well as divine sanction. In a word, the widespread and rapidly advancing power of democracy is acknowledged alike by friend and foe everywhere, and its ultimate

universal triumph the signs of the times would seem to point to with equal certainty. The low, hoarse rumblings of the Nihilist* and other conspirators against existing Russian order are surcharged with ominous significance to the autocratic ear. They are, we may trust, the premonitory symptoms of that grand popular upheaval which, culminating from the gradually accumulating forces beneath, is sooner or later sure to break forth in every nook and corner of that long-scourged land. The inevitable outcome in that event will be the accession of another vast section of the earth's surface to the list of democratic conquests. The railroad, the steamboat, the telegraph, the printing press, and the multiplication and diffusion of the industrial and mechanical arts, to say nothing of the advances of scientific research and discovery, are rapidly hastening this result. In the development, spread, and utilization of these ameliorating agencies, the Anglo-Saxon stands confessedly peerless; a circumstance which manifestly yields him great advantage in the race for mastery. His superior skill, enterprise, and intelligence carry with them superior command over the physical and moral

* By this term is meant all Russians opposed to present Russian order, whether Destructionists or not.

forces upon which the welfare of civilization chiefly depends. As a result, enterprise is stimulated, fresh conquests over nature are won, the means of subsistence are multiplied and expanded, and thereby a more populous, prosperous, and powerful nationality becomes assured. This preponderance in progressive energy is likely, as we believe, to strengthen and expand in accelerated ratio as time goes on for years and perhaps centuries to come. For these reasons, and others which might be set forth, we may believe that it is the Anglo-Saxon, and not the Slav, that is ultimately to win the universal mastery of mankind and to shape the destiny of civilization thenceforward. Those races which—like the American Indian and the Polynesian tribes, for example,—cannot or will not bear absorption or assimilation in this process of expansion, must succumb to the inexorable decree,—the “survival of the fittest.” Nor need harsh or violent measures be invoked to that end. Let industry, commerce and science follow their natural tendency, and, silently and peaceably yet none the less surely and effectively, will the work be accomplished.

• THE OUTLOOK AS TO DANGERS
FROM WITHIN

V.

THE OUTLOOK AS TO DANGERS FROM WITHIN.

BUT if Anglo-Saxon civilization is, as we have here assumed, comparatively secure from danger from without, what shall we say as to the probabilities of danger from within? In the first place, we scarcely need be reminded that we are not as yet to expect ideal perfection in political government, whatever its form. Far as the Anglo-Saxon of this age has left primitive savagery behind, he is yet still farther from that state of Utopian harmony which the optimistic dreamers have so long sought but never found. The student of social phenomena becomes more and more impressed at every step of his progress with the difficulties and perplexities that lie in the way of adjusting the operations of government upon anything like rational ideas of justice, right, and reason.* As Ernst Haeckel has put it, nowhere in nature, no matter where we turn

* See especially *Conflict in Nature and Life*, and *Reforms: Their Difficulties and Possibilities*.

our eyes, does that idyllic peace celebrated by the poets exist. Rather do we find everywhere, and at all times, "a pitiless, embittered *Struggle of All against All*. . . . Passion and Selfishness—conscious or unconscious—is everywhere the motive force of life." * The spectacle thus presented, when we come to reflect upon it, is seen to be, so far as man is concerned, but the practical operations of that law of compensation which was pronounced from the beginning,—“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” It is unnecessary in the present connection to enter into the general philosophical bearings of this law or divine command. Suffice it to say, that it but serves as the crucial process through which and by which alone truth is evolved, man’s capabilities developed, and society leavened with whatever of symmetry and principle it has come to possess. Thus, through what Herbert Spencer

* Senator J. J. Ingalls on this point: “The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Government is force. Politics is a battle for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The decalogue and the golden rule have no place in a political campaign. The object is success. To defeat the antagonist and expel the party in power is the purpose. The Republicans and Democrats are as irreconcilably opposed to each other as were Grant and Lee in the Wilderness. They use ballots instead of guns, but the struggle is as unrelenting and desperate and the result sought for the same.”

calls the "discipline of circumstances," society has "softened while it has ripened," and the mental, moral, and social standard at large has gradually risen to a state immeasurably above where we find it at the time we catch our first glimpses of the human race. Man-eating, theft, murder, the sacrificial altar, polygamy, and slavery, for example, have been either put aside or outlawed everywhere among the nations of Christendom; and it may not be unreasonable to assume, with Herbert Spencer, that this same discipline of circumstances which has already wrought such marked amelioration will go on working still further improvements until eventually there shall be comparatively little need of "judges or statute-books" or of "prospects of future reward or punishment" as incentives for men to do what is right and to desist from what is wrong.

But such approximate fitness for the social state is an attainment infinitely slow of growth; and, for the present, and for a long period to come, we should not expect too much of our progressive institutions. Where so wide a field is left to the exercise of individual volition—which of itself is an indispensable condition of progress—incongruities and abuses will be constantly

obtruding themselves upon us, sometimes to a formidable and alarming extent.

Among the things at present perplexing society where it has attained a highly differentiated state, are the knotty complications attending the rapid concentration of business and capital in enormous aggregates, and the consequent corresponding increase in the number and dependency of the wage-working classes. When, therefore, speakers and writers, like Chauncey M. Depew and Andrew Carnegie, for example, undertake to expatiate in florid rhetoric upon our country's wonderful growth and development since the close of our Civil War, and to point to the period intervening as constituting for this reason the golden age of the Republic, they unhappily leave a tale half told. Bishop Spalding, the distinguished Catholic prelate, has turned attention to the less poetic side of the picture. "A democracy," he takes occasion to admonish us, "where the millions own nothing and the few own millions must fatally fall a prey to socialistic, communistic, and anarchic turbulence, and though thus far there is here no proper soil for such germs to sprout in, the policy which uses all the powers of government to build nests for paupers who, like unfledged birds, shall

eat only when capitalists drop food into their mouths, will soon supply the lacking condition. . . . Our enormous growth in wealth and population blinds us to the truth that the end of popular government is not to make a country rich and prosperous, but to establish morality as the basis of life and law. Character, and not wealth and numbers, is our social ideal."

Ex-Congressman Phillips, in his instructive treatise on *Labor, Land, and Law*, gives us some startling statistics as to the operations of this tendency of the few owning millions and the millions owning nothing with respect to landholding in this country. He tells us that according to the census figures of 1880, more than a fourth of the farms in the United States have already fallen into the condition of landlord and tenant. Over sixty per cent. of the persons occupied in farming are wage-hands. Probably as much as forty per cent. of the nominal farm-owners are paying a round rent in the form of interest, and with a large proportion of these it can only be a question of time when they must succumb to their capitalistic masters. "We have at this time," says this well-informed writer, "almost as many tenant renters as there are in the British Islands. The worst forms of renting

and metayer tenancy prevail. We have no legislation to secure the rights of the cultivator, and none to induce or protect necessary agricultural improvements." The situation, moreover, is greatly aggravated by the circumstance of our immense alien land-holdings. To say nothing of the vast tracts seized upon by home capitalists, speculators, corporations, syndicates, and so on, we find, for example: Four hundred and twenty-five thousand acres credited to the Duke of Cumberland; one million seven hundred and fifty thousand acres to the Marquis of Tweeddale; a half million acres in Florida to a Scotch company; two million acres in the same state to Sir Richard Reid & Co.; and three million acres in the state of Texas to a company of English speculators. The lands — agricultural, mining, timber, etc.— that are held by capitalists, home and foreign, in tracts of five hundred acres and upwards make up in their totality a detail too enormous for recital here. It is enough to know that well-nigh the whole of our public domain in the Great West has been thus unhappily appropriated, and that in our country everywhere the alarming process of squeezing out the smaller independent cultivators is going on, thereby

laying the foundation for a landed aristocracy, or a landed monopoly, it making little difference practically as to the name. Almost precisely the same conditions are now being reproduced in this country as occurred in Europe during the Middle Ages when the smaller alodial holdings were swallowed up by the powerful feudal chiefs.

In the industrial world a no less uninviting phenomenon is thrust before us. "Combines" of one sort and another are out-heroding Herod in their scramble to fasten on to anything and everything in sight which may appear to promise safe and profitable investment. Accordingly, we have the coal trust, the steel trust, the oil trust, the sugar trust, the meat trust, the twine trust, and so on *ad infinitum*. The chances for any man to build himself up from the bottom in any of the old industries are becoming fewer and fewer day by day. Occasionally some man born with exceptional pluck may yet be seen striking out in some enterprise on his own account, thinking to earn an independent living for himself and family as his father had done before him; but ten chances to one if such individual does not sooner or later find himself in the rank and file of the "tin-pail brigade" as a wage-worker for

some huge corporation, it may be for the very corporation which was, indirectly at least, the occasion of his collapse.

Thus we observe, as the good Bishop has warned us, that our country is speedily drifting towards the condition of a plutocracy on the one hand and a proletariat on the other. Popular power thus far has served to little, if any, purpose in warding off this sinister tendency. In Great Britain and her American and Australasian colonies, where democratic influence prevails as nowhere else outside of Switzerland and our own country, the discrepancy in the number of freeholders and non-freeholders is also steadily increasing; while in every other interest, business, or occupation of life the same sort of cankerous influences are in like degree active and alive.

Such perplexities, we say, are to a greater or less extent inseparable from our present moral and social state; but this is not saying that the outcome must necessarily prove fatal. On the contrary, we hold that there is both a disposition and a means available in society, not indeed to annihilate all evil absolutely, but so far to repress or control it in any of its particular manifestations as to strip it of power for disastrous or

irretrievable harm. When the masses become fully aroused to the enormity of any particular wrong or to the danger of any particular exigency, which will certainly happen if the pressure be severe and public opinion be allowed to crystallize and to act, the battle will half be fought and won—the true remedy will no longer be far to seek.

“Be there a will, and wisdom finds a way.”

To attempt to lay down an exact prescription to fit every case would not of course be practicable, so narrow is the range of human knowledge and so wide and varied the world of human ills. Still, a few general suggestions looking in this direction may not be wholly without profit. First, then, let it be accepted as a primary social truth and enforced as an unvarying maxim of public policy that “*sharpness of wit,*” as Mr. Froude has it, “*gives no higher title to superiority than bigness of bone and muscle,*” and that “*the power to overreach requires restraint as much as the power to rob and kill.*” It may indeed be found not an easy task, in endeavoring to apply this principle practically, to set due “restraint” upon “the power to overreach” without at the same time clogging the wheels of civilization generally. This much at

least can be effectually seen to, namely, that the enginery of State be not perverted to aggravate the cause of complaint. It is the pampering and coddling by government, or the gross negligence or villainous complicity in high places, that most enables monopolies to feed and fatten. Surely, the period has now been reached and passed where, with due regard for the public good, we should employ the powers of government by legislation or otherwise further to stimulate and foster such prurient, overgrown corporations as the political and economic policy of this country for the past twenty years and more has brought into being. Cut off such favoritism, and it may be that the levelling tendency of the ordinary economic forces would suffice to curb conscienceless rapacity within decent bounds. But, in any and every event, let it be understood, once for all, that the right and the power of society to rid itself of wrongs and abuses is inherent and inalienable, whatever the measures which may be found necessary to such end.

With regard to the monopoly of the soil and the consequent monopoly of the opportunities for independently acquiring a livelihood, we are not without precedent as to remedies for abuses, terribly rigorous and sweeping though in some

instances these have been. We quote from a writer in *The Forum* of November, 1888:

“Periodical readjustments of property have come with every epoch. When society felt itself too much stifled under the tightening bonds of the few, there came a spasm. In one night the French peasantry set ten thousand manor houses blazing, and so revolutionized the tenure of property which for three centuries had been little disturbed. The spoliation of the monastery lands in the sixteenth century by grasping lords and greedy court favorites was a widespread readjustment. The Jews lost their lands in Spain in the fifteenth century, and the Jesuits were cleared off theirs in the eighteenth. Laws of entail to the contrary notwithstanding, half of England was taken out of the grip of the Catholic recusants under Queen Elizabeth, and vested in the tools of the Star Chamber. Cromwell originated the Irish land question by sweeping the Celts out of three-fourths of Ireland and planting his Ironsides in their place. With such examples before us and knowing that revolutions operate as safety valves of the social mechanism, we cannot but expect a transition from the old-fashioned notion of right, especially when we reflect that the creed of loyalty and obedience is no more, and that the desires of men have most broadened with the progress of the suns. A revision of ideas on property rights is in fact one of the marked tendencies of the present time.”

Later, the same policy of seizure and sequestration of ecclesiastical holdings was mercilessly pursued in all, or nearly all, the Spanish-

American States. We do not say that such extreme measures should be countenanced or repeated. We believe, on the contrary, that in our age and under our system peaceful and lawful remedies may be had for the seeking. We know that by the passage of the Irish Land Bill of 1870, the Parliament of Great Britain seriously infringed the long established right of contract in assuming the authority to fix an equitable rental and to establish a certain property or partnership relation in the land as between the landlord and tenant. This traditional, elementary, and wide-embracing principle of our common jurisprudence once set aside as to land tenure in any one particular, it is easy to imagine that the precedent thus set might be pushed as occasion required to the length of restoring the soil to its original communal ownership. Such a retrogression to primitive ideas is certainly not a result to be desired. It would mean, indeed, nothing less than the utter destruction of our entire scheme of civilization. We would here repeat only what in substance we have before urged, that when the matter of land monopoly becomes noxious and glaring enough to awaken the people to a proper sense of their duty, their inherent right of self-preservation will be asserted, even

to the extent, if thought necessary, of enforcing the Georgian drastic confiscation projects or some other measures equally deep-cutting and wide-sweeping in their purpose and effect.

It may be well to say in this connection that we do not seek to ignore or evade the fact that concentration of capital and effort, and that, too, often upon a vast scale, is an indispensable prerequisite to human progress, if not indeed to the very existence of society itself. But for such concentration, we should to-day most probably have had no railroads, no steamships, no telegraphs; many of our more elaborate manufactures would have been unknown; our vast mining interests would yet in great measures have remained undeveloped; in a word, we should still be groping our slow lengths along in the hopeless gloom of barbarism. Nor do we here overlook the further important fact, that, while business and industrial enterprises of great magnitude undoubtedly tend to aggrandize the few, the effect — whatever may have been the motive — is likewise in some measure to better the many. If Vanderbilt, as suggested by Edward Atkinson, the eminent Boston statistician — “reduced the cost of moving a barrel of flour a thousand miles from a dollar and a half

to fifty cents," he should in so far at least be considered a public benefactor, even if he did at the same time thereby help himself to the extent of a hundred millions or more. For "what he made —" to quote again from Mr. Atkinson — "was but a tithe of what he made for the community."

While admitting all this, however, we cannot help thinking parenthetically in the same breath of another apropos consideration of Froude's, which is to be found in this author's admirable study *On Progress* already quoted from. It is a consideration which applies as well to Vanderbilt's millions expended in princely luxury and ostentation as to that which the noted English writer had immediately in mind, and as well to extravagant expenditures in gorgeous churches and other public edifices as to like indulgences for private or personal gratification.

"The economists," says the authority mentioned, "insist that the growth of artificial wants among the few is one of the symptoms of civilization—is a means provided by nature to spread abroad the superfluities of the great. If the same labor, however, which is now expended in decorating and furnishing a Belgravian palace was laid out upon the cottages on the estates of its owner, an equal number of workmen would find employment, an equal fraction of

the landlord's income would be divided in wages. For the economist's own purposes, the luxury could be dispensed with if the landlord took a different view of his obligations. Progress and civilization conceal the existence of his obligations and destroy at the same time the old-fashioned customs which limited the sphere of his free will. The great estates have eaten up the lean. The same owner holds properties in a dozen counties. He cannot reside on them all, or make personal acquaintance with his multiplied dependents. He has several country residences. He lives in London half the year, and most of the rest upon the Continent. Inevitably he comes to regard his land as an investment; his duty to it the development of its producing powers; the receipt of his rents as the essence of the connection; and his personal interest in it the sport which it will provide for himself and his friends. Modern landlords tell us that if the game laws are abolished, they will have lost the last temptation to visit their country seats. If this is their view of the matter, the sooner they sell their estates and pass them over to others, the better it will be for the community. They complain of the growth of democracy and insubordination. The fault is wholly in themselves. They have lost the respect of the people because they have ceased to deserve it."

Yet, on the other hand, it may be — as Mr. Mallock's *Science of Society* would have it — that to take from a Vanderbilt, a Carnegie, or the owner of the "Belgravian palace" the motive to eclipse his fellows in the pomp and glitter of wealth and social pretension, we should have no

accumulated millions to expend either in reducing the cost of the necessaries and comforts of life, or for the luxuries to satisfy the vanities of the rich. Indeed, the more the problem is studied the more complicated and far-reaching becomes its conditions and the more are we impressed with the wisdom of desisting from hasty conclusions and rashly conceived measures.

The centralization of business and capital, from the consideration of which we digressed a moment ago, should be regarded from still another point of view. George Gunton, one of the more clear-sighted thinkers that the present protracted agitation of this class of subjects has brought to notice, lays it down as a fundamental principle, that consumable wealth is most abundantly produced and most generally distributed among the masses in proportion as the use of productive wealth (capital) is concentrated. He further affirms it as a generalization deduced from reliable statistics, that in proportion as this principle comes into play, there is a corresponding increase both in the productive capacity per capita and the income per capita, as well as in the rate of wages, of the community concerned. For instance: "In this country (the United States) and in England, where the concentration

of capital is the greatest in the world, the productive capacity per capita is nearly two and a half times that of the average in continental countries, five times as large as that of Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and twelve times that of China and India; and the income per capita is about thirteen times as great as that of India and China, six times that of Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and more than twice that of the average on the European Continent; and the general rate of wages in England is about ten times that of Asia and nearly double that of Continental Europe; while in this country it is about fifteen times that of Asia, and within a fraction of three times that of the average on the Continent." It will be observed, in passing, that it is accumulated wealth devoted to production, and not to the idle purposes pointed out above by Mr. Froude, that is here discussed as contributing to the general comfort and happiness.

But in this matter, perhaps, as in most other matters, there exists somewhere a golden mean beyond which a virtue may be pushed till it becomes a vice. In the present instance, it may be suggested that such golden mean is likely to be found at that point where competition has stimulated enterprise up to the maximum of

healthy development, and has not been pressed so far as to assume the character of monopoly. The same reasoning would seem to hold in this feature of economics that Alexander Hamilton applied to civil and religious rights. "In a free government," writes this genius, matchless as a statesman and political philosopher, "the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplication of interests, and in the other in the multiplication of sects. The degree of security in both cases, will depend upon the number of interests and sects." Obviously, a despotism may grow out of industrial conditions no less rigorous and searching than out of civil, political, or religious conditions. To strike at one's right to acquire food, and clothing, and fuel, and shelter, is to strike at his most vital concerns. To insure an even-handed chance for the enjoyment of this right, no stronger guarantee could be found than that resulting from a "multiplicity of interests," and the wholesome, chastening, live-and-let-live influence which is thus produced.

Another aspect of the sociological problem may be studied with profit. It is that of the force or value of law as a reforming agency. A

writer, already cited approvingly, lays great stress upon the principle "that political institutions are not the cause but the consequence of the industrial conditions and social character of the masses." Thus, "instead of regarding our social evils as the result of our political institutions," we should recognize the fact that "it is only by improving the industrial conditions and elevating the social character of the masses that we can maintain the integrity of our democratic institutions." In the recognition of this doctrine and the enforcement of its teachings, it is held, lies the best, if not the only, protection that the workingman and the masses generally can hope for. Less hours of work and thus more hours for culture is the surest guarantee for a higher rate of wages; for the price of labor is fixed, not so much by the law of supply and demand, as by the social and intellectual attainments of the wage-worker himself. Political quacks, like medical quacks, prescribe a ready nostrum for every ill; but the true office of law, as of medicine, is to seek to assist nature, and not to create it anew. Intelligent prescription as well as the measure of results, will depend in either case entirely upon the nature and the condition of the subject operated upon. It is not contended,

indeed, that governmental interference is a matter of indifferent concern in this connection. For by adjusting the burdens upon a fair and equitable basis; by keeping down taxes to the actual public needs; by maintaining an honest and efficient civil service; by affording equal and adequate protection to all persons in the enjoyment of liberty and property; by encouraging and promoting the cause of mental and moral education,—by these and various other means government may do much in the way of advancing the general weal. But if there is any principle or doctrine in the consensus of sociological science that is clearly and firmly settled—that bears upon it the stamp of the highest authority from the days of Solon to the present time, it is that the character of political institutions is the true sign and measure of the character of the people concerned; from which fact follows the obvious corollary, that to reform the political life, the process must begin by reforming the people first. We cannot, therefore, too often or too strenuously insist upon the vital truth before quoted from the eminent Catholic ecclesiastic, *“that the end of popular government is not to make a country rich and populous, but to establish morality as the basis of life and law.”*

POLITICS AND MORALITY

VI.

POLITICS AND MORALITY.

THE moral phase in politics here touched upon suggests much that should invite serious reflection. That there is generally an exceptional laxness in this direction, is a fact too palpable to be questioned. Mr. Lecky, in his brilliant and scholarly *History of European Morals*, has adverted to such prostitution of the political conscience. "The moral standard of most men," he says, "is much lower in political judgments than in private matters where their own interests are concerned. There is nothing more common than for men who in private life are models of the most scrupulous integrity to justify or excuse the most flagrant acts of dishonesty and violence, and we should be altogether mistaken if we argued rigidly from such approvals to the general moral sentiments of those who utter them." If, for instance, in this country we should accept as an index of the general morals of the people the half-indifferent,

half-apologetic spirit in which the Oak Ameses, the Belknaps, the "Whiskey Crooks" and the hordes of other political offenders, great and small, have been looked upon and dealt with, we should certainly make a pitiable showing to the world as a cultured and Christian nation. One good, however, may result from this untoward state of things: it may lead to the exercise of greater caution and wisdom in drawing the line between the business that properly belongs to the State and the business that belongs to private enterprise.

Probably one of the most common and most reprehensible forms in which such default or perversion of the moral faculty appears, is seen in the personal and mercenary abuses which it is made to subserve. To one at all versed in the ways of politics in its narrowest and less laudable sense, an almost infinite number and variety of illustrations will suggest themselves in this connection. Among these, several may be noted as sufficiently serving our present purpose.

First, take the so-called Internal Improvement schemes. There was a period in the history of this country when the question of policy involved in this subject constituted a leading issue between the two great political parties. Not so to-day,

by any means. So far from it, the apostles of every sort of party affiliation who seek to profit by such projects outvie each other in striving thus to secure the biggest "grab" from the public treasury. The average member of Congress is not at all insensible of the fact that a generous provision in the Appropriation bill to be applied in his district will go a long way in his favor at the succeeding general election, the actual public benefits to accrue from the expenditure, if cutting any figure at all, being quite an incidental and remote consideration in the premises. Hence the amount of "log-rolling" * that is practiced

* "Log-rolling" is an exchange of favors. Representative A. is very anxious to secure a grant for the clearing of a small water-course in his district, and representative B. is equally solicitous about his plans for bringing money into the hands of the contractors of his own constituency, whilst representative C. comes from a seaport town whose modest harbor is neglected because of the treacherous bar across its mouth, and representative D. has been blamed for not bestirring himself more in the interest of schemes of improvement afoot amongst the enterprising citizens of his native place; so it is perfectly feasible for these gentlemen to put their heads together and confirm a mutual understanding that each will vote in Committee of the Whole for the grants desired by the others, in consideration of the promise that they will cry "aye" when his item comes on to be considered. It is not out of the question to gain the favoring ear of the reporting Committee, and a great deal of tinkering can be done with the bill after it has come into the hands of the House. Lobbying and log-rolling go hand in hand.

behind the scenes in the furtherance of such projects would astound and put to blush the uninitiated in the mysteries of legislative procedure, could they be brought to realize its frequency and its magnitude. Thus are the bills for the alleged improvement of rivers and harbors in the interest of navigation and commerce usually loaded down with sham propositions one after another till the original measure is distorted out of all semblance of symmetry or even of decency.

The pension system affords another tempting field for the debasement of the politician and of politics, because of the wide facilities it offers for the subsidizing and debauching of voters. As to the pension system in itself considered, we need not here be told that the people of this country always turn with grateful hearts and a free and open hand towards the men who sprang to the defense of the nation in its hour of dire extremity. The fact that our annual budget for this purpose has run up year after year till it is said now to exceed the entire cost of the military department of any nation on the globe, affords evidence enough upon this point. But what the people have reason to complain of, and what they do complain of, is the questionable motive

which too often lies behind this lavish expenditure. Few persons, we may imagine, are so obtuse or so deluded as for one moment to believe that the extraordinary zeal and activity displayed by Congress and the pension bureau just upon the eve of a congressional and perhaps a presidential election, are prompted purely by the bubbling over of a generous, grateful, patriotic spirit. What aggravates the matter still more is the evident fact that no semblance of proper discrimination between the worthy and the unworthy can possibly be regarded in any such promiscuous, helter-skelter raids upon the general treasury for corrupt and selfish ends. But it is a long lane that has no turn. Human forbearance has its limit. The only thing to be deplored in this case is, that when the day of reckoning comes, as come it certainly will sooner or later, the good may be doomed to suffer along with the bad.

In the same category belong commercial monopolies and the various favored interests which by grace of partial tariff legislation are enabled to feather their nests by plucking the public. The beneficiaries of this system of spoliation are so all-powerful in controlling the purse-strings, subsidizing the organs of public

opinion, and plying the bread and butter argument upon the dependent voter, to say nothing of their immense leverage in a social way, that they combine to make up a political force which is well-nigh irresistible at the ballot-box. The candidate for public preferment who dares to champion the cause of the people in the face of such mighty combinations is well aware that as a rule he can count upon reaping his only glory in coming out of the contest unwept and unsung. Let, for instance, a Morrison, a Carlisle, or any other gifted and courageous member of Congress show a disposition to antagonize these protected interests, and then observe with what gloating zeal and relentless savagery these pampered favorites will dog the heels of such congressman, should he appear before his constituents for re-election.

The tariff system itself from its peculiar nature invites abuses. In the first place, the system is unjust. The whole burden falls on consumption and none on property. As the amount one consumes bears no necessary correspondence to the amount of property one owns, the rich pay, on the average, out of all semblance of just proportion less of the taxes than the poor. In the second place, the system rests upon

deception. The tax is confounded with the price of the commodity, and is paid in the first instance by the importer and not by the purchaser or consumer. By this circumvention the consumer is unable to discover how much tax he pays or how, when, or where he pays it. This mode of beating about the bush is not a new one. More than eighteen centuries ago we find a striking precedent. It is related, for instance, "that Nero had abolished the duty of the five-and-twentieth part arising from the sale of slaves; and yet he had only ordained that it should be paid by the seller instead of the purchaser. This regulation, which left the import entire, seemed nevertheless to suppress it." Though we might imagine this sort of statecraft to be quite befitting a Nero and the time in which he lived, yet we should hardly be prepared to reconcile such tactics with our lofty claims to culture in this the closing decade of the boasted nineteenth century. Certainly no right-minded person would complain of contributing his proper proportion for the support of government; but he has a right to know, and ought to know, and should demand to know, precisely the amount he pays and the way he pays it. Yet, strange to say, this Neroian artifice, this patent

imposture, still almost universally passes current for sound statesmanship and is even widely looked upon, not as a makeshift to be discarded when public sentiment becomes ripe for something better, but as a positive good* to be extolled and indefinitely continued.

The protective element adds still further objection to the system; for in this case the evils complained of extend not only to the imported article, but to the domestic as well. As the great bulk of interests cannot profit by embargoes upon imports, the effect of such restrictions is to favor certain interests with special advantages over the others. "No tariff which the United States imposed could, for instance, encourage the growth of grain or cotton, the raising of cattle, the production of coal oil, or the mining of gold or silver; for instead of importing these things, we not only supply ourselves but have a surplus which we export. Nor could any import duty encourage any of the many industries which must be carried on where needed, such as

* John A. Kasson in *The Forum*, Dec. 1887: "You tell me that I am fearfully burdened by my share of the customs taxation, say \$250,000,000. Perhaps I am, but I do not feel it; I do not know it; for I cannot feel it. No visible collector calls on me for it, and my books take no account of it. If I die, no claim is made for it against my children or my estate."

building, horseshoeing, the printing of newspapers, and so on. Since these industries that cannot be protected constitute by far the larger part of the industries of any country, the utmost that by tariff legislation can be attempted is the encouragement of only a few of the total industries of a country." To introduce direct bounties or other devices so as to put all interests upon a level in this respect, would be to put a speedy end to protection altogether; for, disguise the fact as we will, that inequality in legislative favoritism by which the strong and the crafty hope to ride into wealth and prominence upon the backs of their less fortunate or less unscrupulous fellows is the main-stay and prime motive-force of the whole protectionist scheme.

Yet we are to deal with conditions as we find them, and not as we would have them. As we have said, the system of customs taxation is the accepted policy of the country, and we cannot hope for immediate or radical changes. The people will bear no such thing, and no political party, whatever it may profess, will, when put to the test, venture upon the experiment. Several suggestions, however, seem eminently pertinent and timely in this connection.

First—Let it be recognized that *the tariff is a tax*, and that by no possible sort of subtlety or jugglery can it be made anything but a tax. We should then have less over-plethoric accumulations in the national coffers to breed debauchery, extravagance, and rapacity, and to lead in the end to financial panic and general business disaster. We should then, for instance, hear less talk of such wild schemes as that of distributing the surplus national revenues among the several States instead of lowering the taxes to prevent such excesses, or as that of converting the Government into a sort of pawnshop where certain industrial classes might obtain loans at low rates upon lands or chattels pledged as security.

Secondly—Let it be seen to that *public taxation be for public purposes only*. To insist upon this maxim would be to divert the business of government from the fostering of private enterprises at the public expense, to strip the lobby of much of its corrupting occupation, and thus to infuse into our political policy some of the ingredients of common sense and common decency.

Thirdly—Let *luxuries, not necessities, bear the burden*. In this the revenue system of Great Britain is much nearer to a rational basis than

ours. There the customs duty is at present confined chiefly to spirits and wine, tobacco and tea, these producing for the year 1888-89 nearly nineteen-twentieths of the whole amount. The excise tax largely exceeds the customs. The items of intoxicants and tobacco, with the customs duties on the same, contribute more than fifty per cent. of the national income. The income tax ranks third in the list in productiveness, making nearly sixteen per cent. of the total.*

In this country for the same financial year the receipts from customs constituted nearly seven-twelfths of our whole revenue, and the bulk of this duty we know is laid upon what are called necessaries. An income tax was imposed during the period of the Rebellion; but while the

* Ely, *Taxation in American States and Cities*: "Taxation tends to diffuse itself, but on the line of least resistance. Now, the line of least resistance is found among the poor, the line of great resistance among the rich; whereas the line of moderate resistance will be found among people of moderate circumstances. . . . Tax-assessors fear to assess the wealthy, as they do the poor, because the wealthy have great power to harm or help one. In no place in the United States are the wealthy properly assessed. . . . This does not imply that any one class is either better or worse than another. It is a question of the power of resistance. The poor people and the people in moderate circumstances would often be but too glad to imitate conduct which they condemn, had they the power."

war rate has been maintained on imports, the income tax was the first to be repealed upon the return of peace. The explanation of the latter fact is readily apparent. The tax was direct; there could be no question as to who paid it; it fell chiefly upon the well-to-do and influential classes; hence its short lease of life.* A graduated income tax, if judiciously planned and coupled with a like graduated tax upon land, would certainly operate as a wholesome check upon the inordinate concentration of wealth. But for the same reason that the income act which we did have was so short lived, it would be difficult to return to a similar policy and if adopted difficult to maintain it. The subject, if again mooted, will, therefore, most likely be approached with a cautious, gingerly hand. The legislator, like most other men, very naturally

* *Whitaker's Almanack* (London), 1890: "All modern Chancellors have found this elastic (Income) tax most useful; it is so productive and withal so easily managed; should any emergency arise a penny can be put on; a war scare—two pence; more ships—three pence. The great mass of the public never complain of its being too heavy; the tax does not reach them; in point of fact they like to see an addition. In principle the tax is fair, but there are too many evasions, and but few artisans, whatever their earnings, contribute to it at all. The lowest income ever touched (in England) is 150 pounds, and on incomes below 400 pounds, a deduction of 120 pounds is made."

looks much more to expediency than to principle. As Buckle has put it, "In the present state of knowledge, politics, so far from being a science, is the most backward of all the arts; and the only safe course for the legislator is, to look upon his craft as consisting in the adaptation of temporary contrivances to temporary emergencies." In the matter of state finance, the officials charged with this department observe that a certain estimated expenditure is to be met, and that method which is likely to provoke the least resistance is that which will be adopted, with little if any regard to other considerations. For this reason import duties and other indirect and disguised forms of taxation meet with continued popular favor.*

Next and lastly, a brief reference to the state of our civil service. To begin with, it is perhaps hardly too much to say of this that the virus of the "spoils system" permeates and defiles our politics through all its ramifications from its central seat at Washington down to the village ward caucus. Its general debasing effects are too well and too generally understood to need specific explanation or comment. What attention we can give the subject here must be

* Morgan, *Ancient Society*, ch. iii.

confined to a passing glance at its operations at its head centre, at the national capital. The facts we would present have been so tersely and forcefully set forth by Senator George F. Edmunds in a recent magazine article that we can do no better than to reproduce for our contemplation a sample paragraph from his pertinent and timely utterances.* He says:

“The mercenary greed of office, the corruption of the electors and the falsification of returns are very closely allied. The first is very likely to produce the others. As selfishness and ambition are innate qualities of the human mind, it cannot be expected that the thirst for the power and profits of place will ever be much diminished, but its gratification can be repressed in just the proportion that the moral sense of the people in regard to elective offices, and that of the appointing power in respect of the other offices, can be roused into firm and vigorous exercise. Taking the country all together, it can be safely affirmed that the people in the election of their own officers protect themselves in this respect to a greater degree, in proportion, than those selecting the appointive officers have been so far enabled to do. After every election in which a president, or governor, or other officer having the power of

* “The experience of four thousand years should enlarge our hopes and diminish our apprehensions;” for “every age of the world has increased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the human race.”—Gibbon’s *Roman Empire*, ch. xxxviii.

patronage is chosen, the pressure upon each and all of them, by and in favor of political workers, for immediate appointment, is far greater than those not having the immediate personal means of knowledge can well imagine. A great part of the time of a president and his heads of department, that needs to be given to public matters of general importance, is absorbed in deciding between the conflicting demands of many political workers for places that all together do not amount to one-tenth of the number of applicants, each one of whom is disappointed that he has not been taken before all his fellows. And all are pleased in common if any old incumbent, no matter how perfectly he may be discharging the duties of his office, no matter how steadily he may have refrained from 'pernicious activity,' no matter how high his character, no matter how well the public interest is promoted by his service, is at once dismissed, in order that each one of the claimants may compete for the prize of the vacancy. We have had brave declarations of virtue and good intentions on this subject from all political parties for some years, but the performance has, so far, fallen shamefully short of such professions. Indeed, these promises and declarations have been treated, after elections, with ribald and systematic contempt. Nobody in a republic is or should be in favor of an office-holding class; but as the great bulk of the small administrative employments are those involving no policy of government, and merely call for the exercise of particular and strictly-defined business work, it is difficult to suggest upon what ground they should be treated differently from other business employments in the country, in respect of which the question of the political opinions of those

employed is almost never heard of. It would be an astonishing spectacle, and one everybody would condemn, if at every change of directors in a great railroad or manufacturing corporation, all the station-agents, engineers, line-men, and operatives should be dismissed, in order to make places for successors whose political or other opinions were supposed to be like those of the new board of directors. The business of the government is of common interest to every one of its citizens, and to be successful it must be conducted upon the same principles and by the same general methods that are found to be wise and adequate in private affairs; and in these the man would be thought demented who should maintain that the views of the station-agents or engineers, or factory workmen on the subject of protection, or woman suffrage, or any other of the questions of public consideration, make them any more or less fitted for or entitled to employment."

President Cleveland, in entering upon the duties of the chief magistracy of the Nation, certainly set out upon the right road and in the right spirit. That "Public office is a public trust" is a political maxim the soundness of which cannot be successfully questioned. That Mr. Cleveland did not better succeed in applying this maxim to the condition of affairs he found at Washington was, we believe it is now generally conceded, more the fault of the vitiated party sentiment of the time than of the purity of purpose on the part of the Chief Executive.

"Public office is a party perquisite!" is the rank and rotten maxim of party ethics with which the presidential office had to contend. It is encouraging, however, to note as one of the healthful signs of the times, that Mr. Cleveland's administration, in spite of all the embarrassments under which it labored, did make some real, substantial progress in the way of abating the crying abominations of the "spoils system," and that the present administration has also conceived it feasible and expedient to follow up in some measure the advantages which had been thus secured. Nothing indeed ought more to commend President Harrison to the favor and gratitude of all right-minded citizens than the denunciation that he has invited and that he has received from the army of voracious spoils-seekers because of his refusal to do their whole bidding. It is, moreover, to be most earnestly hoped for and prayed for that the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves, who in truth have no real interest in politics apart from a wise and economical administration of government, will suffer no backward step to be taken on this question. *Put no spoilsman on guard!*—let this henceforth be the watchword and talisman of the people, first, last, and in every event.

The shortcomings in our public service are indeed obvious enough and vicious enough to be readily discovered and heartily abominated; but where rests the responsibility for their existence? It is easy enough to cudgel the legislator and the party wire-puller; but are these really the only classes to blame? Do we not claim that ours is a "government of the people by the people" and if such it is in fact, are not the people themselves rather than their public servants primarily to blame? If we like to be humbugged, as the prince of American showman is said once to have told us we did, why there will always be found plenty of tricksters to practice the art upon us to our hearts' content. As pointed out in that suggestive little book, *Reforms: Their Difficulties and Possibilities*, the man in public station has really very little choice as to the course he may pursue, if he would retain his place as against others less scrupulous than himself, and not have undone what his judgment and his conscience might have prompted him to do. To quote the trenchant words of this authority:

"A young statesman soon discovers that the open, honest advocacy of really just measures would render him unpopular and drive him from public life. The people are not always just to their benefactors because they do not always

clearly discriminate who their benefactors are. For this reason, honest service in behalf of the people is not at all certain to meet its proper reward. Hence, our young 'statesman' allies himself with those intelligent and powerful class interests which are more apt to reward service and which control the means of creating public sentiment. It is only in this direction, that he can be sure of a substantial reputation and steady political preferment. It does not matter if by birth and education he belongs to the great body of the people; there is shoddy in politics as well as in social life. The politician must study the drift of the strong interests and adapt himself. If such drift requires the sacrifice of weaker classes, he must adapt himself none the less. For his ends—success and power—it is far better to go along with the deceived many than to be right with the discerning few. No high-toned character with deep convictions can be a successful politician; he only can be who has no such convictions. A fairly honest man in politics must often find himself compelled to act on policy when he would prefer to act on principle. It is a common observation that the best men are kept out of politics. Thus it is shown, both by the character of parties and politicians, that interest is too strong for equity. This is not always true of individuals, but it is always true of parties and classes. A class or party confounds interest with patriotism; it always gets what it can, and keeps all it gets; and, if it defers to the rights of others, it is only to get more."

**THE PEOPLE AND SELF-
GOVERNMENT**

VII.

THE PEOPLE AND SELF-GOVERNMENT.

FROM what has been said of the lack on the part of the people in properly discerning their interests, holding their public servants to account, and extending encouragement to meritorious motive and effort, it may appear to cast grave discredit upon the principle of self-government itself when considered as a concrete, practical entity. A little closer attention to the facts, however, will, it is thought, serve largely to dispel any such feeling of distrust if entertained.

That a free polity is the best under all circumstances and conditions is a proposition which is not indeed for a moment to be entertained. When Solon was asked if the laws he had given the Athenians were the best, he replied, "I have given them the best they were able to bear." The great law-giver thus laid down a maxim for the guidance of statesmen which through all the centuries since he flourished has never been improved upon. Herbert Spencer but pushes

this sociological principle a little further where he maintains "that the genesis, the maintenance, and the decline of all governments, however named, are alike brought about by the humanity to be controlled"; and "that, on the average, restrictions of every kind cannot last much longer than they are wanted, and cannot be destroyed much faster than they ought to be." We are to infer, therefore, that the usual sentimentality expended in behalf of "the down-trodden of other lands" is sheer waste of sympathy. Nations will become free about as soon as they are fitted for freedom, and no sooner, whatever we may say or do to hasten them. Montesquieu, indeed, declares that "Liberty itself has appeared intolerable to those nations who have not been accustomed to enjoy it," and there is not wanting ample historical warrant to support such a declaration. When upon the accession of one of the Russian empresses, it was proposed somewhat to limit her authority, the people protested. "Let her be an autocrat like her predecessors," was the vehement outcry with which the proposal was greeted. "The table was prepared," as one of the liberal princes in deep humiliation put it, "but the guests were not

worthy." Several of the successors of this empress set out in their respective reigns with liberal ideas and liberal purposes, but soon found themselves constrained to fall back upon the bare despotism to which the people were accustomed. The several attempts at establishing constitutional government in Spain met with like speedy disaster. The flame of liberty there flickered above the horizon for a day, when it was summarily snuffed out by the hands of those for whom it had been kindled. Even in the so-called Republic of France, about which we are prone to make so much ado, it is not inaptly said that "new democracy is old despotism differently spelt." The outward show is there, not the inward reality. Still, such aversion to change is not perhaps, after all, to be scouted as an unmixed evil, as it tends to preserve that balance of power between extremes, which is the mainstay and sheet-anchor of society. If Russia had not despotism, she would have anarchy. In France the imperial sub-structure upon which the republican framework is superimposed, is the nation's strongest safeguard against like danger. In most of the States of Europe indeed it is the moral force of the mailed hand known

to abide about the throne that serves to preserve political autonomy and public order. The Spanish American States have affected our democratic clothes; but, never having been trained in the democratic fashion, they cut a sorry enough figure in trying to wear them.

The truth is, the instinct of the masses is very conservative. As Mr. Bagehot has expressed it, a new idea is painful to the most of them, so much easier is it to tread along in the old well-worn ruts than to blaze out new paths. Progress is at best a slow and tedious process. It has been estimated, for instance, that man spent three-fifths of the period of his existence on the earth in groping his way out of the status of savagery. The process, even in the most advanced societies of to-day, is still slow and gradual, never by sudden leaps and bounds, and always upon the prolongation of the lines of prior development. The initiative of most reforms comes from above, and not from below. "The sun illuminates the hills while it is yet below the horizon; and truth is discovered by the higher minds a little before it is manifest to the multitude." Thus was it as to the struggle between Christianity and Paganism in the earlier ages of our era. And coming down later and nearer home,

Mr. Lecky would have us believe that if a vote had been taken at any time during the first years of our Revolution the result would have shown a decided preference on the part of the Colonies to abandon the cause of Independence and resume their allegiance to the British Crown. The same spirit of conservatism was also observable in the feeling with respect to our Civil War. It was the leaders on either side, not the people at large, that brought about the conflict. So also as regards general improvements. Sir Henry Maine is certain that, "if for four centuries there had been (in England) a very large electoral body, . . . there would have been no reformation of religion, no change of dynasty, no toleration of Dissent, not even an accurate Calendar. The threshing-machine, the powerloom, the spinning-jenny, and possibly the steam-engine would have been prohibited, . . . and we may say generally," this author goes on to assert, "that the gradual establishment of the masses in power is of the blackest omen for all legislation founded on scientific opinion, which requires tension of mind to understand it and self-denial to submit to it." *

* Green's *English People*, ch. i; Stubb's *Const. Hist. of Eng.* i. 48.

But it is comforting to know that, after all that can be said of the stubborn conservatism of the masses, the patent fact remains that in all Anglo-Saxon countries there has been genuine, verifiable progress, and that every succeeding moment is still being signalized by new and important triumphs in the cause of civilization. Already in these Anglo-Saxon countries have the people become the ruling power of the State. "No one now dares talk of bridling the people, or of resisting their united wishes," says Buckle. "The utmost that can be said is, that efforts should be made to inform them of their interests, and enlighten public opinion; but every one allows that, so soon as public opinion is formed, it can no longer be withstood." A little attention to history upon this point will enable us the better to interpret the conditions we have thus evolved, and, when comprehending their import, the more wisely to direct their tendency. Going back, then, to the earliest records, we find the politics of our Aryan ancestors democratical, but of course measurably unregulated and unrestrained by the force of law. An elective chief, a council, and an assembly composed of all the freemen of the community were the cardinal elements of the polity which these people

brought with them to Europe from their original homes; and these elements they carried with them wherever they thereafter went. Infinitely modified as varied and varying circumstances and conditions have required, these original political germs have continued to form the groundwork of Aryan polities down to this day. The germs of monarchy and of aristocracy are discernible in political organisms from the first; but, as Mr. Freeman suggests, beyond these nascent forms there was an armed and free people in whom the ultimate sovereignty unquestionably resided. From the chief, the council, and the popular assembly there sprang, respectively, as direct lineal descendants, the Kings, Lords, and Commons of the English Constitution; and from these latter estates, in turn, were borrowed the President, Senate, and House of the American Constitution. The judicial function as a co-ordinate branch is a later differentiation. Though the germs of the representative system may be traced, as Green and Stubbs point out, to quite remote times, yet as a practical working device of government the contrivance was wholly unknown to the ancients. When the democratic machinery failed them, they had no known alternative but the rule of the one or the

few and the subjection of the many. According to M. Guizot, it is not until the thirteenth century, and then only in England, that a "real and positive instance" of the use of the scheme of representation is discoverable.

As political integration went on by the compounding and recompounding of the smaller social aggregates with the larger — as the gens into the tribe and the tribes into the confederacy or State — the popular assembly fell into disuse by reason of its unwieldiness and the burden it imposed in consequence of the great distance many of its members would be required to journey to the place of the periodical moots or meetings. The germ of royalty resided in the chief, as the germs of aristocracy resided in the council, and these monarchical elements constantly grew at the expense of the democratic element until, in Rome under the Caesars, and later throughout the Teutonic nations under the dominance of the feudal chiefs, the people almost wholly disappeared as a factor of government. Mr. Bagehot tells in a few pithy words how the ancient popular principle came to be revived in the English Constitution through the rise of the Commons as the dominant branch of Parliament — how, successively, "the slavish

Parliament of Henry VIII. grew into the murmuring Parliament of Queen Elizabeth, the mutinous Parliament of James I., and the rebellious Parliament of Charles I." Shortly after followed the Revolution of 1688, when the era of popular reforms was fully inaugurated, which movements, as we have seen, were greatly accelerated by the causes which precipitated the revolutions in France and in America a century later.

The peculiar circumstances under which the people of the British Colonies in this country had been reared and the peculiar discipline which they had undergone were singularly favorable to the development of the conditions prerequisite to self-government. No fact was more patent than this to the minds of the men who framed the Federal Constitution. "It was evident," wrote Madison in the *Federalist*, "that no other form (of government than one strictly republican) would be reconcilable with the genius of the American people; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all of our political experiments upon the capacity of the people for self-government." We know that with Thomas

Jefferson faith in this popular principle was, from first to last, an intense religious conviction, and that his ideas upon this point stamped the character of our national policy for sixty years of our national existence. We know too, how Abraham Lincoln, inspired by a like faith and trust in the people, never for an instant doubted the final issue when the life of the nation long hung trembling in the balance. In the beautiful and impressive words of George Bancroft, he "was led along by the greatness of their self-sacrificing example; and as a child, in a dark night, on a rugged way, catches hold of the hand of its father for guidance and support, he clung fast to the hand of the people, and moved calmly through the gloom."

It is hardly necessary in this connection to add, as a general fact, that our hundred years of national experience has served but to confirm our faith in the "signal sagacity and prescience" of the Fathers in thus justly recognizing and interpreting the deep-seated bias of the American people for popular institutions, and in constructing from the materials at hand a framework of government so consummately adapted to the successful working out of the principle. The "danger of a leveling spirit"—of an "excess

of democracy,"— which Gerry, Sherman, and Hamilton so much feared and deprecated, has by no means been realized. Yet we have no doubt gone much further in this direction than was ever dreamed of in that day; further, indeed in some respects, than history or tradition ascribes to any of the primitive Aryan democracies. In our earlier history the archaic notion descending to us from the tribal communities of ancient Germany, that political rights and powers are inseparably joined with the ownership of the land, still largely prevailed in this country, as it has continued to prevail in Great Britain down to our own time, though with a constantly abating tendency.

The successive popular movements by which we have broken away from those old moorings and which in this country have finally brought us to the acceptance of universal suffrage, it must be admitted, have not always been attended with altogether satisfactory results. Nor have the motives which have brought about such extensions of the political franchise always been of the loftiest character. In England the exigencies of the struggle between the king and the barons, and in this country the exigencies of the struggle between political parties, have no doubt

had quite as much to do with the matter as any considerations of State or of the classes enfranchised. The extent to which ignorance and venal practices still prevail at popular elections, both in England and the United States, makes it quite manifest that the electorate might be liberally pruned down or weeded out without seriously compromising the best interests of the State. It would have been much the sounder policy for us in this country to have thrown some restrictions about the right of suffrage so as to exclude all such elements as did not comprehend the dignity and sacredness of that high prerogative and such as were incapable of social or ethical assimilation. Especially was the sudden enfranchisement of the three million ex-slaves of the Southern States, utterly destitute as these people were of education, of property, of political training, or of other prerequisites of citizenship, a most immense and disastrous experiment. We shall have more to say of this egregious crime against suffrage in another place. But with respect to the assimilable elements which we have clothed with the right of suffrage, it is perhaps generally conceded that these popular concessions have, upon the whole, accomplished more good than evil and promise no less liberal

balance of advantages for the future. Grant that the Dennis Kearneys, Herr Mosts, and other kindred pestiferous agitators, may run, as they now and then have run, their brief, sickly hour. Yet we need not doubt that the sober second thought of the people at large can always be counted on to restore the normal course of events before much serious harm can ensue. If our type of democracy instinctively revolts at the pretensions of absolute or irresponsible rule as applied to itself, it no less radically and heartily abominates the lawless schemes and proclivities of the socialists, anarchists, nihilists, or what-nots,* that abide at the other extreme. Happily, however, even our most uncultured classes of voters who have any conception at all of the dignity and responsibility of citizenship, usually evince enough of native common sense to take a practical view of affairs, and to demand a higher standard of qualification for public office than they are conscious is likely to be found

* Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, ii. 272: "There may be pernicious experiments tried in legislation. There may be occasional outbreaks of violence. . . . One thing, however, need not be apprehended, the thing with which alarmists most frequently terrify us; there will not be anarchy. The forces which restore order and maintain it when restored are as strong in America as anywhere else in the world."

upon their own level. And, what is more, such electorate has generally proven itself leavened with enough of sturdy, homely virtue to answer fairly well the essential requirements of popular government. As Matthew Arnold has frankly testified of that body, "it in general sees its social and political concerns straight and sees them clear." We know full well indeed that in these respects we are as yet scarcely out of our swaddling clothes. We know that ignorance, selfishness, prejudice, and passion still too largely dominate our thought and action. Mr. Arnold, as an example, has hardly overdrawn our conspicuous shortcomings as exhibited over the unconscionable farce of the Guiteau trial. Yet, upon the whole, we have brought to our task enough of sterling qualities to build up and successfully work one of the greatest nations of history, and what we yet most lack intellectually and morally we believe we may safely entrust to the free school, the free pulpit, and the general teachings of experience to supply.

Another aspect of the question of suffrage invites examination. The successive advances in this direction, it is to be noted, have not, generally speaking, been suddenly sprung in the nature of sheer experiments. They have been

the product of no evanescent or adventitious conditions. They have been, rather, the natural and legitimate outgrowths of new or altered social developments, which had been long and gradually taking definite shape and consistency. In other words, they have been in the main simply the normal manifestations of natural forces—the development and introduction of the additional machinery which the intellectual and material progress of the State had rendered necessary and inevitable. And what is true in this respect of the United States is still more true of Great Britain. Sir Thomas Erskine May, unlike Macaulay and other writers of monarchic bias who have been quoted, accepts this growth and diffusion of democratic influence as the sign and measure of actual social advancement, and takes occasion to speak with becoming pride of the improvements which as results of this impulse have been wrought out in his own country since the Reform Act of 1832. The constant development of popular influence, as the outcome of the intellectual and material progress of nations, he believes should be accepted as natural law. His reasoning on the principle involved in the movement is quite as applicable on this side of the Atlantic as on the

other, and will here be reproduced so far as space will permit. He says:

“Such a law, like other laws which shape the destinies of man, is to be reverently studied, and accepted without prejudice, as a beneficent influence designed for the general benefit of society. Let us not be too prone to condemn, or dread it, as a social danger. Rather let us learn to interpret it rightly, and to apply it, with careful discernment, to the government of free states. If it be a law that the progressive civilization of a nation increases the power of a people, let that power be welcomed, and gradually associated with the state. The same cause which creates the power, also qualifies the people to exercise it. In a country half civilized, popular power is wielded by a mob; in a civilized community, it is exercised by the legitimate agencies of freedom,— by the press, by public discussion, by association, and by electoral contests. If ignored, distrusted, defied, or resisted by rulers, it provokes popular discontents, disorders, and revolutions; if welcomed and propitiated, it is a source of strength and national union. To discern rightly the progress of society, and to meet its legitimate claims to political influence, has become one of the highest functions of modern statesmanship.”

Such “electoral contests,” it may be added, should be frequent if the best results would be obtained. This policy, we are aware, is looked upon with more or less disfavor; nevertheless, those who have given the most study to the

subject are fully persuaded that the compensations resulting, if properly considered, largely outweigh the drawbacks. By this means only can the government be kept close to the people, the laws in any sort of correspondence with the social facts. In this way the political and social forces, like the forces of physical nature, are allowed to perform their appointed functions, not by the violent, capricious modes of "demolition and reconstruction," but by the natural, regular, gradual, peaceful processes of growth and development. To be sure, now and then things will at best go more or less awry. But an outburst, a blast, a "tidal wave," is equally sure equitably to square the account and leave all concerned the better for what has happened.

There is a stage in the progress of human development, no doubt, when the relation of lord and vassal is essential to the maintenance of any sort of security of person and property. As Mr. Mill has remarked, until "mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion, . . . there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one." But with the Anglo-Saxon race the element of "free and equal discussion" long since became a

prominent, if not a ruling, attribute of politics. In proportion as this power has made itself felt in society, the need of a system of suzerainty, or paternalism, has passed away, and, as a consequence, the privileged classes—the “God’s anointed”—have themselves gone into decline. The general spread of intelligence, the rise of the middle classes, the emancipation of thought and conscience, the supplanting of the militant by the industrial type of society, the development of the principle of representation,—these facts all testify to the marked upward transitions which we have thus undergone. Whatever reason, therefore, that may once have existed for the support of royalty and aristocracy, that reason, so far at least as Anglosaxondom is concerned, exists no longer. “The United States”—to quote again from Walter Bagehot—“could not have become monarchical even if the constitutional convention had decreed it, even if the component states had ratified it.” The elements essential to monarchy had become entirely wanting. The same acute publicist has been quoted on a previous page as saying with respect to England that there the living essence of a Republic has intruded itself within the dead shell of the Monarchy. The prerogatives of the

Crown have passed to the Ministry, and the function of the Lords as an estate of the realm has shrunken into a like state of comparative impotence. Practically speaking, the Commons are now the Parliament, and the People the Commons.*

What else, indeed, than this was to be expected, considering the notorious incapacity of the monarchic elements for anything but a nominal place in the body politic, even if no other influences had been operating to the same purpose? The born-king, for example, is put down by our same clever critic as but "an average man to begin with; in the long run he will be neither clever nor stupid; he will be the simple, common man who plods the plain routine of life from the cradle to the grave." The peerage is characterized in terms scarcely more complimentary. "Being a set of eldest sons picked out by chance,"

* As Prof. Wilson (*Cong. Gov.*) shows, the same tendency of the legislative branch to override and absorb all governmental powers has been in progress in this country, as well as in Great Britain. The "checks and balances" and the division of functions among co-ordinate departments—safeguards against the encroachments of despotism which were so much relied upon by Montesquieu and succeeding statesmen and political theorists generally down to a quite recent date—have been found in practice to be largely mythical. The branch that holds the purse-strings holds the key to the entire citadel of government.

it cannot be very wise. It would be a "standing miracle" if such "accidents of accidents" should possess a knowledge equal to that of men who had raised themselves to eminence by sheer dint of their own exertions. True, the Crown * and the aristocracy of England still command much deference and loyalty among Englishmen, and thus exert, indirectly, no little influence upon the character and trend of English political life. But it seems scarcely conceivable that a potentiality like this, springing not from superior worth, superior knowledge, or superior ability, but simply and solely from the empty glamour of hereditary caste, should be long allowed to clog and hamper the boasted genius and aptitude of

* The relation of the Crown to the Government is given at length in *Fifty Years of the Eng. Const.*, by Amos. But the following epitome from Bagehot's *Eng. Const.* must suffice for our present purpose: "In addition to the control over particular ministers, and especially over the foreign minister, the Queen has a certain control over the Cabinet. The first minister, it is understood, transmits to her authentic information of all the most important decisions, together with what the newspapers would do equally well, the more important votes in Parliament. He is bound to take care that she knows everything which there is to know as to the passing politics of the nation. She has by rigid usage a right to complain if she does not know of every great act of her ministry, not only before it is done, but while there is yet time to consider it—while it is still possible that it may not be done." In short, it is her right "to be consulted, to encourage, to warn."

the Anglo-Saxon for the business of self-government. If it is desirable to "kotch" to somebody, as it is said every Englishman must,* why not let it be to the nobility of democracy—the self-made nobility of nature—the nobility which over here is native and to the manner born; which naturally and fittingly drops into the leadership of modern Anglo-Saxon society; which, no less than Macaulay's "select class," "is, and knows itself to be, deeply interested in the security of property and the maintenance of order?" This, obviously, is the rational, practical view to be taken. It is the view that accords with the matter-of-fact spirit of modern enlightened thought; and the view, if the signs of the times mean anything, that must enter more and more deeply and with increasing celerity into the minds and habits of the Anglo-Saxon race till in the British Empire, as in the United States, the last vestige of feudalism shall be swept away and the full fruits of a true Republic shall be realized.

* For a racy description of this obsequiousness to rank and title see Badeau's *Aristocracy in England*.



**THE PRINCIPLE OF
INDIVIDUALITY**



VIII.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY.

ONE of the most important transitions marking the progress of social order is the transition from community to individual responsibility. In the lower stages of culture, the status of each individual is determined by the accident of birth, and accountability for offenses rests upon the corporate community, and not upon the particular offender. The peculiarity of such adjustment is to repress all tendency to variation from the start. "Fixed custom which public opinion alone tolerates is imposed on all minds, whether they like it or not." The intense superstitious awe with which this custom comes everywhere to be regarded, coupled as it always is with the idea of corporate responsibility, affords a true explanation of that spirit of persecution for nonconformity which is all-pervading in the earlier periods of religious history. "The whole community is possessed with the idea that if the primal usages of the tribe be broken, harm unspeakable will happen in ways you cannot

think of, and from sources you cannot imagine." In such society communism and social equality are realized in their utmost perfection, and yet, if we may believe the testimony of those whose research and observation have enabled them best to judge, the people thus favored are nevertheless far from happy. War at this stage is the chief pursuit; and divination, sorcery, witchcraft, torture, mutilation, human sacrifice, cannibalism, penury, famine, pestilence make up the dread round of life. Contrary to the popular notion, the primitive man "is nowhere free. All over the world his daily life is regulated by a complicated and often most inconvenient set of customs (as forcible as laws), of quaint prohibitions and privileges; the prohibitions as a rule applying to the women, and the privileges to the men. Nay, every action of their lives is regulated by numerous rules, none the less stringent because unwritten." The life of the modern savage, for example, notwithstanding the poetic fancies of the halcyon days

"When wild in woods the noble savage ran,"

"is twisted into a thousand curious habits; his reason is darkened by a thousand strange prejudices; his feelings are frightened by a thousand

cruel superstitions. The whole mind . . . is, so to say, *tattooed* over with monstrous images; there is not a smooth place anywhere about it." Surely, then, "Looking Backward" through the true lenses of history will disclose little data upon which to build hopes for the ideal socialistic state.

The idea of the complete absorption of the individual in the State continued to be a cardinal feature of ancient politics even up to the period of highest development. Plato taught "that the aim of government should not be the happiness of the individual, but that of the whole; and that men are to be considered not as men, but as elements of the State, a perfect subject differing from a slave only in this, that he has the State for his master." * This doctrine was a fundamental part of the Roman polity from first to last. That the State exists for the benefit of the individual, and not the individual for the benefit of the State, is an idea distinctly modern and Anglican. The principle was first applied to the right of conscience. "Over the soul," taught Luther, "can and will God allow no one to rule but himself alone." But Luther, like all his

* See Leiber's *Political Ethics*, ch. xiii, where this feature is quite fully discussed.

contemporaries, knew little of individual civil liberty. It was in England, and through the "great rebellion of the laity against the clergy," that the principle of Individuality as a universal maxim took permanent root and was nurtured to maturity. America's most eminent historian thus speaks of this principle as it operates in our national polity, where its influence is given freer and fuller scope than anywhere else in the world:

✕ "The Constitution establishes nothing that interferes with equality and individuality. It knows nothing of differences of descent, or opinion, of favored classes, or legalized religion, or the political power of property. It leaves the individual alongside of the individual. No nationality of character could take form except on the principle of individuality, so that the mind might be free, and every faculty have an unlimited opportunity for its development and culture. As the sea is made up of drops, American society is composed of separate, free, and constantly moving atoms, ever in reciprocal action, advancing, receding, crossing, struggling against each other and with each other; so that the institutions and laws of the country rise out of the masses of individual thought, which like the waters of the ocean, roll evermore."

It is to this fundamental quality of our political scheme that we owe that marked parity that exists between those "institutions and laws"

and the character and genius of our people; a circumstance which a few years ago evoked such admiration and favorable comment from Matthew Arnold, on the occasion of his first visit to the United States. "As one watches the play of their (American) institutions"—so his observations impressed him—"the image suggests itself to one's mind of a man in a suit of clothes which fit him to perfection, leaving all his movements unimpeded and easy. It is loose where it ought to be loose, and it sits close where it ought to be close. . . . This wonderful suit of clothes is found also to adapt itself naturally to the wearer's growth, and to admit all the enlargements as they successively arise."

Another important benefit accruing from this characteristic is that, from the constant circulation that is going on among the units of society from bottom to top and from top to bottom no stratification into distinct classes as appears in the societies of the Old World has with us occurred or is ever likely to occur. As Gen. Garfield has eloquently expressed it:

"Our society does not resemble the crust of the earth with its impassable barriers of rock; but resembles rather the waters of the mighty sea, deep, broad, boundless, but yet so free in all its parts that the drop which mingles

with the sand at its bottom is free to rise through all the mass of waters till it flashes in the light on the crest of the highest wave. There is no boy in America, however humble his birth or in whatever depth of poverty his lot may be cast, who, if he has a strong arm, a clear head, and a brave heart, may not rise by the light of our schools and the freedom of our laws, until he shall stand foremost in the honor and confidence of his country."

Mr. Arnold regards this circumstance as a fact of much importance, and as one that completely confutes Macaulay's Cassandra prophecy, wherein this great historian predicted that "in the course of the next century, if not in this," our democracy was "certain" to cost us our "liberty or civilization, or both." Mr. Arnold argues, further, that because of this trait in our society and our consequent freedom from the pernicious effects of social castes, our country is, when compared with the countries of Europe, comparatively exempt from the evils that breed revolution. He believes, moreover, that the good elements in our society make a way for us to escape out of what we really have of this danger; also, "to escape"—he emphasizes—"in the future as well as now—the future for which some observers announce this danger so certain and formidable."

Still another no less important benefit arises from the operation of the principle in question. It holds out and guarantees to all men an equal chance in the race of life, so far as the law can make that chance equal. Thus, an impetus is given to that inborn desire in every human being to better his own condition, and he is thereby enabled to make the most of whatever powers and qualities of mind and body of which he may be naturally possessed. If this competition, or equal opportunity, permits one man to outstrip another, and sometimes to abuse the freedom vouchsafed him, it also does more. It tends not only to bring to the front and keep at the front the best and the fittest members of our society, but also to elevate the mental, moral, and material standard of the humanity at large. Because of this incentive to individual effort held forth to all, our country has evolved a race of men which Mr. Froude — by no means a biased observer — has admitted to be surpassed nowhere on earth. “They feel the dignity of freedom and the worthiness of moral virtue.” They are further, he says, keenly alive to the consciousness that “behind each American citizen America is standing,” and each man is “the man that he is” because of the ennobling impulse such consciousness

inspires. Thus we have, as a general result, two forces at work supplementing and re-inforcing each other,—the individual modifying the political institutions, and the political institutions in turn modifying the individual. Such interaction between the society and its component parts, it is obvious, can but redound largely to the betterment of all concerned.

The genius of Anglo-Saxon society is peculiarly favorable for the growth and assertion of such principle of individuality. Along with the rise of the popular branch of the British Parliament, there were also evolved as necessary concomitants the right of petition and the right of assembly, together with the freedom of speech and of the press. These were not the gracious, generous gifts from the willing hands of power. They had to be fought for inch by inch. But once won, their fruit has been cherished as inestimably sacred by every Englishman in whatever land. It is not strange, therefore, that, when we came to frame a Constitution for ourselves, especial care was taken that these principles be made the subject of positive declaration. The constant exercise of the rights thus guaranteed sufficiently attest the popular value set upon them as parts of the functions of society

and of the State; and our appreciation in this direction is heightened the more when by contrast we contemplate the conditions in Continental Europe, where to the ordinary citizen the ear of government is always difficult of access if not wholly and rigidly denied. Those great popular meetings which are so common in Great Britain and in the United States, and which when conducted within legitimate bounds exert such a wholesome and potent influence upon the action of government, are almost if not altogether unknown outside of Anglo-Saxon countries. Elsewhere, if the popular pulse ever makes itself felt at all, it bursts forth in the way of an explosion, as was the case in France during the first Revolution, the purpose and effect of which convulsions are always to tear down and destroy rather than to upbuild and improve.



POPULATION AND SUBSISTENCE



IX.

POPULATION AND SUBSISTENCE.

NOW, a brief glance at the so-called "science of population." The subject is one which concerns every civilized country; hence our own; and hence the attention given to the matter in this place. The usual remedy thus far proposed for excess of population has been the old, old one,—emigrate, emigrate. Great Britain, for example, has been urging her surplus population to seek homes in her colonies; while in America "Go West, go West," has been the familiar refrain. But this, manifestly, can serve but as a temporary expedient, and does not at all go to the core of the difficulty. The "colonies," it is readily observed, must in time fill up, and our great Western expanse is rapidly undergoing the same process. When these outlets become closed up, and other habitable parts of the globe likewise no longer afford additional room, what then? This is the problem that has long vexed the sociologist and the philanthropist, and that led the Rev. T. R. Malthus in 1798, when more than half the world was yet in the possession of

the savage, to promulgate his famous formula, that the tendency of the human race is to increase faster than the means of subsistence. Among the agencies which he enumerated as necessary to preserve the equilibrium between the number of mouths to feed and the wherewith to feed them, were "all unwholesome occupations, severe labor and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, large towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine."

This theory, even with its implied denial of the beneficence of Providence, was almost universally accepted by writers on social and economic subjects during the first half of this century, and was made the ready scapegoat for all the penury and wretchedness that, in the crowded centres of population, pinched and starved, Tantalus-like, in the midst of opulence, ease, and plenty. The idea still has many adherents, but it is by no means so widely credited now as formerly. Godwin, Allison, Doubleday, and Spencer are ranked among the eminent authorities in Great Britain that reject the hypothesis; and even Whately, Mill, and McCullough, while acknowledging the principle, are free to admit that thus far counter

tendencies have neutralized its effects. Indeed, McCullough, like Macaulay in his chapter on the "State of England in 1665," goes much further in this direction. "Let any one," he says, "compare the state of this (England) or any other European country five hundred or a thousand years ago and he will be satisfied that prodigious advances have been made, that the means of subsistence has increased much more rapidly than population, and that the laboring classes are now generally in possession of conveniences and luxuries that once were not enjoyed by the richest lord." In this country, Carey, Thompson, Bowen, George, and Atkinson are among the more prominent assailants of this so-called "science."

So far as the question of over-population is concerned, it is coming to be denied, on high authority, both in this country and abroad, that there is at present, or ever will be, any such thing. Congestion at some points often happens, as the flood-tides of civilization surge this way or that, and the centres of population are constantly changing; but, with a proper diffusion of numbers, it is felt that there is, and always will be, room enough for all. Professor Thompson and

Henry George argue ably and convincingly to this effect; and Professor Haeckel, perhaps the greatest of German philosophers living, asserts it as an accepted biological truth that, "taken as a whole, the number of living animals and plants on our earth remains always about the same. The number of places in the economy of nature," the writer goes on to explain, "is limited, and, in most parts of the earth's surface, these places are always approximately occupied. Certainly there occurs everywhere and in every year fluctuations in the absolute and relative number of individuals, of all species. However, taken as a whole, these fluctuations are of little importance, and it is broadly the fact that the total number of all individuals remains, on the average, almost constant." This general statement of a biological principle is in the same connection made to apply specifically to human beings, as well as to other species of organic nature. Herbert Spencer's incomparable analytical and deductive powers have been brought to bear to the elucidation of the same problem. Certain natural forces, he tells us, come into play when needful to preserve the wonted equilibrium between population and its environment—between the number of mouths to feed and the wherewith to feed them. Such

adjusting forces are held to be self-regulative in their operations, and the processes involve none of the revolting consequences incident to the Malthusian concept. Says the profound author of "A System of Synthetic Philosophy":

"The excess of fertility has rendered the process of civilization necessary; and the process of civilization must inevitably diminish fertility, and at last destroy its excess. From the beginning the pressure of population has been the proximate cause of progress. It produced the original diffusion of the race. It compelled men to abandon predatory habits and take to agriculture. It led to the clearing of the earth's surface. It forced men into the social state; made social organization inevitable, and has developed the social sentiments. It has stimulated to progressive improvements in production, and to increased skill and intelligence. It is daily thrusting us into closer contact and more mutually dependent relationships. After having caused, as it ultimately must, the due peopling of the globe, and the raising of all its habitable parts to the highest state of culture; after having brought all processes for the satisfaction of human wants to perfection; after having at the same time developed the intellect

into complete fitness for the social life, — the pressure of population must gradually bring itself to an end.”

As to the capabilities of the soil, Mr. Atkinson, who has devoted much attention to the subject, arrives at the cheering conclusion “that there need be no fear of want, because there is room enough for all. . . . No man yet knows the capacity of a single acre of land with respect to food. . . . In the world there is somewhere and always enough. The only question is, Where is it? When found, the next question that arises, is, How to get it?” Those persons who, like the present writer and many others in this country, have been privileged to witness personally the transition of regions from the state of nature to a state of high cultivation, and the society from the rude, simple state of savagery to a refined and complex state of civilization, and have noted the relative increase in the necessaries and comforts that have accompanied such transition, will be the better prepared to accept Mr. Atkinson’s conclusions thus advanced as to the comparative inexhaustibility of the productive resources of nature, if but the hands of industry be applied to their development and their adaptation

to the needs and desires of man. Indeed, it requires but the most superficial glance at the facts of primitive society to become convinced that the lower the scale of social and material development, the more habitual and pinching the poverty, and the more frequent and destructive the ravages of famine and pestilence. And, *vice versa*, as this scale of culture rises, the average standard of human comfort and happiness, it is seen, unmistakably rises with it. Enforced idleness and its accompanying destitution and distress, of which unhappily we are now-a-days too frequently the witnesses, is undoubtedly attributable more to undue congestion of some part of the industrial organism than to a diseased condition of the whole. But whatever the derangements which may from time to time ensue from this source, the difficulty need not perforce be of more than temporary duration. In this era of personal freedom, of cheap, easy and rapid transit, of wide and intimate intellectual and commercial intercourse, and of generally broad, cosmopolitan ideas, one locality or one occupation becoming unduly crowded is readily exchangeable for another. Thus may we hope it will ever be.

Another argument damaging to the theory in question might be urged, were it necessary. In espousing the claims of such theory, it is not difficult to perceive that the whole moral tenor and conduct of our lives belie the sincerity of our professions. If we honestly believe that humanity is to starve at last, why, as Mr. Atkinson suggests, "all our efforts to prevent war, to stop famine, to alleviate poverty; or to save life from disease and pestilence?" For, truly, if such is to be the frightful end, "the more we accomplish for the present generations of men, the more must posterity suffer, the more urgent must the struggle for life become, the more fearful must be the anarchy when the whole art of living can consist only in securing a sufficient subsistence for the few by any method of force or fraud, even at the cost of those who starve." Few persons, we imagine, would be willing to accept a doctrine which when pushed to its full logical consequences they would find so thoroughly monstrous. Rather should we, taking all in all, acquiesce in the more rational, hopeful conclusion that, whatever the social or economic afflictions which come upon us, the fault is to be sought in ourselves or in the maladjustments of society,

and not (as Malthus would have it) in the pitiless, inexorable dispensation of a niggard and ill-ordered Providence. Such at least, is the humane, the Christian-like view, and the view which would appear to be amply sustained by the preponderance of facts.

**LEADING FEATURES OF THE
AMERICAN POLITY**

X.

SEVERAL LEADING FEATURES OF THE AMERICAN POLITY CONSIDERED.

THUS far in this hurried sketch, the Anglo-Saxon race has been considered so far as practicable as one people, the several branches being regarded as closely enough of kin in blood, in ideas, and in institutions to warrant such method of treatment. That the framers of the American Constitution copied the British model as closely as the conditions would admit of is a fact too manifest to be successfully questioned. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches were thus fashioned; and the principles, rights, and guaranties adopted were nearly all borrowed from the various English historic codes and charters from the reign of Alfred to the reign of William and Mary. The same is true of the constitutions and bills of rights of the several States of the Union.

But it is equally manifest that in some particulars there is a marked difference between the original and the copy. While most of these

features peculiar to the American instrument had been conceived on English soil, they yet had never found a place in English law. Among these may be mentioned, first, the idea of Federal-Republicanism. Through the union of Church and State in England, the persecuted Dissenters learned to hate the secular authority equally with the ecclesiastical. Monarchy was at the head of the Church, and Monarchy they hated because, as the head of the Church, it was the supporter and abettor of the intolerable wrongs they were suffering. This sentiment and feeling the Pilgrims of the *Mayflower* brought with them to the New World, where they were carefully and sacredly nurtured until ultimately they bore their fruitage in the blood of the Revolution. Royalty and aristocracy, with all their train of monarchical accompaniments, they left beyond ocean. They brought with them, politically, only an implacable hatred of monarchy and an unbounded love of liberty, and these sentiments and feelings would be satisfied with nothing short of unalloyed republican institutions. True (as mentioned on a preceding page), Adams, Hamilton, and other statesmen equally patriotic, cherished theoretically a decided bias for the English Constitution.

Hamilton would have the Executive and the Senate chosen for life. Indeed, there then appeared to be an opposite tendency which was perhaps equally to be dreaded. "All the evils we experience," said Gerry, "flow from the excess of democracy. . . . He had been too republican heretofore, but had been taught by experience the danger of a leveling spirit." The all important problem with the Constitutional Convention was to devise some mechanism by which to bind these discordant elements together, and at the same time to give strength, stability, and harmony to the system. After long, patient, patriotic, often excited effort, a Federal Republic was born, the first in all history.

The absolute divorcement of Church and State, and the complete secularization of politics, were then also untried experiments in government. Our country was the first to guarantee not only religious toleration, but absolute religious equality. The Constitution, we know, expressly declares that —

"No religious test shall ever be required, as a qualification to any office or public trust in the United States."

And, again, the Constitution states that —
"Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

Justice Story says of these provisions: "It was under a solemn consciousness of the dangers from ecclesiastical ambition, the bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of sects, exemplified in our domestic, as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude from the national government all power to act on the subject. The situation, too, in the different States equally proclaimed the policy, as well as the necessity, of such an exclusion." The spirit of the law has been well set forth in an opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "It intermeddles not with the natural and indefeasible right of all men to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; it compels none to attend, erect, or support any place of worship; or to maintain any ministry against his consent; it pretends not to control or to interfere with the rights of conscience, and it establishes no preference for any religious establishment or mode of worship. It treats no religious doctrine as paramount in the State; it enforces no unwilling attendance upon the celebration of divine worship." It is sufficient to add, that the experience of a hundred years has

fully demonstrated the wisdom of the Fathers of the Republic in the adoption of this grave experiment. Everywhere the principle has become firmly intrenched in our national life, and canonized in the hearts of our people.* The influences which led to this advanced step cannot, however, be credited wholly to Anglican sources; for at the beginning of the Revolution, it is well known that neither the mother country nor the American colonies were particularly distinguished for their devotion to the principles of religious liberty. Each of the thirteen colonies still had some kinds of restrictions or regulations on the subject of religion; and in New York and Massachusetts, these went to the length that Catholic priests were held liable to imprisonment, and even to death. We should look rather to France for the chief impelling forces which led to that happy consummation. No doubt the

* This is undoubtedly the result to which the progress of civilization everywhere tends. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Q. C. (before quoted) is the only contemporaneous layman of note known to me as questioning the soundness of the principle. Among other things upon this point he says: "I think that governments ought to take the responsibility of acting upon such principles, religious, political and moral, as they may from time to time regard as most likely to be true, and this they cannot do without exercising a very considerable degree of coercion."—*Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, 53.

rationalistic and sceptical spirit which culminated in the French Revolution, created a profound sensation in America, and that the teachings of Bayle, Montaigne, Descartes, Voltaire and Rousseau found their highest expression in the fundamental law of the new Republic.

A third leading characteristic of the American polity is the wide latitude it allows to home rule. To cultivate habits of self-reliance among the people, and to confide to their management so far as practicable their domestic concerns, is among its foremost aims and loftiest virtues. "It is axiomatic," says Judge Cooley, "that the management of purely local affairs belongs to the people concerned, not only because of their being their own affairs, but because they will best understand and be most competent to manage them." The great value of this principle is forcibly illustrated by John Stuart Mill. "In proportion," he says, "as a people are accustomed to manage their affairs by their own active intervention, instead of leaving them to the government, their desires will turn to repelling tyranny, rather than to tyrannize; while in proportion as all real initiative and direction resides in the government, and individuals habitually feel and act as under its perpetual tutelage, popular

institutions develop in them not the desire of freedom, but an unmeasured appetite for place and power; diverting the activity and intelligence of the country from its principal business to a wretched competition for selfish prizes and the petty vanities of office." The extent to which this idea of decentralization should be carried out in actual practice—that is, how liberally or otherwise the Constitution should be construed in this direction—is by no means settled in this country even to-day. It is, indeed, still a living, burning political question, as it ever has been since the days of Hamilton and Jefferson—a question which no general prescription seems able strictly to limit or to define. We cannot, however, shut our eyes to the patent fact as to the direction in which the powers of government in this country are drifting. From the very beginning, and especially since the close of our Civil War, the tendency has been for the Federal authority to swallow up that of the States. Prof. Woodrow Wilson, in his *Congressional Government*, has brought out this fact in vivid light. One after another of the powers and functions of the State governments have slipped away through the encroachments of the general government until the powers of the latter, through its hundred

thousand officers and through the stretching of its legislative and administrative functions, is brought "home to every man's door, as, no less than his own State government, his immediate overlord." The reconstruction acts, the national banking act, the federal supervision of general elections, the inter-state commerce act, the oleo-margarine act, the commissions appointed to inquire into this, that, and the other alleged grievance, are instances with which we of this day are all of us but too familiar. Yet there are being pushed or are being mooted a thousand and one other schemes looking to a still further extension of the policy of centralization. Such are the Blair educational bill, the projects to purchase and control the railroad and telegraph lines, the plotting to set up a federal censorship over the political concerns of the States of the South upon the plea of protecting the negro, and, most wild and dangerous of all, the scheme of the Farmers' Alliance to convert the Government into a loan agency for the benefit of a special class. Is it not indeed high time, in view of the alarming spirit prevailing in this direction, that we call a halt, look well to our bearings, and see if we are not rushing with dangerous precipitation either toward communism on the one hand

or despotism on the other? Little wonder, indeed, that the temper of the times should have brought forth the spawns of Henry Georges and Edward Bellamys. It should be remembered that nothing is so fatal to progress as uniformity. As Herbert Spencer shows, the course of evolutionary development is wholly in the other direction,—from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. One of the causes that hastened the downfall of Rome was her policy of endeavoring to cramp all the interests of her vast empire within a single iron mould. Society needs to be so subdivided as that each part shall serve by emulation, rivalry, and example to stimulate and energize every other part. This principle is best subserved in the relations of a true federal republic; and the American people cannot exercise too keen a vigilance in seeing to it that the happy political interaction thus secured be not allowed, upon one pretext and another, to become seriously impaired.

Again, the American system is based on a theory of sovereignty which is exactly the converse of the English theory. In America the ultimate power resides in the people, and to this theory the entire nomenclature of government strictly conforms. In all departments, the

people are constantly kept in view as the source whence springs all legitimate authority. In England, on the contrary, though the government may as a fact be a "disguised republic," yet that disguised republic is in theory well-nigh an absolute despotism.* The Crown represents the entire body politic. "Her Majesty's dominions," "Her Majesty's government," "Her Majesty's subjects,"—such is the style of phraseology that runs through her whole political system. So dominating is the influence of these symbolisms of monarchy that the bulk of the English subjects even yet see in the government

* What the forms of law would allow the Queen to do without consulting Parliament, were the ancient prerogatives not circumscribed by the force of public opinion, is not a little surprising in view of the actual practice of the Constitution of to-day. "Not to mention other things, she could disband the army (by law she cannot engage more than a certain number of men, but she is not obliged to engage any men); she could dismiss all the officers, from the General Commanding-in-Chief downwards; she could dismiss all the sailors too; she could sell off all our ships of war and all our naval stores; she could make a peace by the sacrifice of Cornwall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She could make every citizen in the United Kingdom, male or female, a peer; she could make every parish in the United Kingdom a 'university'; she could dismiss most of the civil servants; she could by prerogative upset all the action of civil government within the government, could disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could, by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against foreign nations."

the Crown and nothing but the Crown. Indeed, England's autocratic forms and symbolisms are the chief bulwarks of her monarchical institutions; while the democratical forms, symbolisms, and habits of thought on this side of the ocean, are among the strongest safeguards of our democratic institutions.

It may be well in this connection to state what is meant by the word *sovereign* or *sovereignty* in a democratical polity. It does not now mean as it once meant the absolute despotism of the majority; it means the rule of the majority within the forms and limitations prescribed by law. Neither the officers of state, nor indeed the whole body of the people themselves, are permitted for an instant to step beyond the bounds thus circumscribed. M. Guizot, the accomplished French historian and statesman, has given us a most rational definition of this much abused term. He holds that in true representative government that power can reside nowhere—not in one man, not in the majority, not even in the whole people; it can be sought after only in the infinite realms of reason, justice, and truth. "All powers," he says, "which exist as a fact, must in order to become a right, act according to reason, justice, and truth. No man, and no body of

men, can know and perform fully all that is required of reason, justice and truth; but they have the faculty to discover it, and can be brought more and more to conform to it in their conduct." The majority may be presumed to have discovered the true law; but the majority, no less than the minority, are liable to err. Hence the acts and the opinions of the dominant party ought at all times to be left open for criticism, and for revision should they prove to be unsound or inexpedient. Justice Story also lays down the doctrine that, in a republican government, it is a "fundamental truth that the minority have indisputable and inalienable rights; that the majority are not everything and the minority nothing; that the people may not do what they please; but that their power is limited to what is just to all composing society." In a word, to restrain the majority and protect the minority, and give free play to the pursuit of "reason, justice and truth," is the chief purpose of Constitutional law everywhere.*

* The ancients never for a moment doubted the inherent right of government, however constituted, to do absolutely as it pleased. Hence the ease with which the functions of state were then often usurped in turn, as it might happen, by the one, the few, or the many. See Lieber's *Political Ethics*, ch. xiii.

Lastly, the American Constitution and its British prototype differ as to form, the one being said to be written and the other to be unwritten. The former is sometimes objected to upon the ground that being written, it lacks the flexibility and adaptiveness necessary to meet the varying conditions of a growing and aggressive civilization. It will be remembered, as an instance in point, that President Buchanan in one of his official messages proclaimed that he was without constitutional warrant to employ force to suppress the insurrection in the Southern States. And only the other day, so experienced a statesman and loyal American as Mr. Blaine announced in a public speech the opinion that certain of the crying abuses which had fastened themselves upon the country were "largely private affairs" with which neither the President nor anybody else had "any particular right to interfere."

But the People — the tribunal of last resort in popular government — have shown thus far, in every instance when put to the test, that they were by no means as yet prepared to abdicate their sovereign majesty in any such listless, ignoble way. They have shown, on the contrary, a vivid consciousness of their having been reared in

the tradition and belief that to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence," and "promote the general welfare" are among the first objects for which governments are ordained among men. We know at what tremendous cost of men and means the nation repudiated Buchanan's pronouncement of our constitutional impotence to save the Union. The nation looked upon its common interests through no such superfine lenses; the instinct of patriotism and of plain, practical common sense was its sole and trusted guidance. It took up the gauge the Secessionists had thrown down with an eye single to the conviction that, with the nation as with the individual, self preservation is the all-paramount law. President Lincoln hesitated not an instant when occasion was pressing to brush away his predecessor's over-wrought niceties of the Constitution as if they were of the merest cobweb, and he struck at Secession from every available quarter, utterly regardless of any hair-spun notions as to the hows and whys. "I felt"—so he wrote in 1864—"that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong I

assumed this ground, and now I avow it." This was indeed but putting in strong words what in a less direct and overt form has been the general practice of the government, in its several departments, from the first. The prompt and decisive voice with which the country rejected the startling and dangerous proposition of the distinguished statesman from Maine gives ample proof that this same spirit of self-protection is still keenly alive in the people, and is intent upon asserting itself whenever the occasion may arise for its need.

So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the direct and implied grants it confers, we shall doubtless always find in the future, as we have found in the past, are broad enough and strong enough for every exigency. Constitutional law, like other law, is to be interpreted in the light of "reason, justice and truth"; and, to be efficient, the written, equally with the unwritten, should be adjustable to the legitimate demands of society,* whether the particular

* Wilson, *Congr. Gov.*: "Ours is, scarcely less than the British, a living and fecund system. It does not, indeed, find its rootage so widely in the hidden soil of unwritten law; its tap-root at least is the Constitution; but the Constitution is now, like Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights, only the sap-centre of a system of government vastly larger than the stock from which it has

matter in question was or was not contemplated in the original design. Formal prescriptions not thus eligible and responsive, though seemingly in force, are in reality a dead-letter as natural principles silently spring into operation in their stead. In other words, it is the unwritten law—the *jus naturale*—constantly making and operating from beneath and from within, which in progressive society constitutes the real organic life of the State, and which goes before and shapes and reshapes the outward written formulas, breathing into these their only practical force and vitality. Indeed, to quote the pointed words of Judge Hammond, “No truth can be clearer to the student of history and law than that a written constitution of any value always presupposes the existence of an unwritten one; . . . the constitution as an *objective* fact must exist, before the constitution as an *instrument of evidence* can have any value. The worthlessness of written constitutions that have not unwritten ones beneath and behind them is one of the frequently recurring lessons of the

branched,—a system some of whose forms have only very indistinct and rudimental beginnings in the simple substance of the Constitution, and which exercises many functions apparently quite foreign to the primitive properties contained in the fundamental law.” Cf. Marshall, C. J., Wheaton, xii, 332.

nineteenth century.”* Formal revision or amendment is an expedient of frequent utility, but more so as a mode of law-declaring and law-defining than as a mode of law-making. But, usually speaking, in the practical conduct of government the processes of construction and interpretation, through the several organs of state, afford ample facility for bringing into proximate harmony the outward *appearance* of the law with the inward *substance* of the law. Thus the wonderful structure and genius of the

*“What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not than what it is. It is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but the consequence, of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought. There is nothing primitive in it: It is all derived from a known source. It presupposes an organized society, law, order, property, personal freedom, a love of political liberty and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard it against the encroachments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every instance a limitation upon the powers of government in the hands of agents; for there never was a written republican constitution which delegated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie dormant in every nation, and are boundless in extent, and incapable of definition.” 15 Mo. 13. See further Guizot, *Hist. Rep. Gov.* 427; also 30 Iowa, 45.

Roman law was almost wholly evolved; thus have we derived the elements of our common law; and thus are legislative statutes made applicable to the facts of society. It was the discovery and utilization of this unwritten constitution "beneath and behind" the written one that, under cover of "implied powers," furnished such a convenient and "formidable weapon" in the hands of Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall during the more nascent and tentative stages of the life of our Constitution. The ready, sagacious, almost intuitive, faculty displayed in the use of these constructive and modifying expedients in developing the latent powers of that instrument and in adapting these to the requirements of the national life, is the fact that lent to the fame of the great jurist its brightest lustre, and that called forth from Gen. Garfield that eloquent eulogy to his memory,—“He found the Constitution paper, and made it a power; he found it a skeleton, and clothed it in flesh and blood.” Thus was the national polity placed upon a basis which rendered it entirely adaptable to the national life under all conditions and for all time.

Citizenship and suffrage have been touched upon on a preceding page. Something more needs be said on the subject in this connection, as

it presents several features which have a significance peculiar to this country. One of these features is the practice of appealing to racial and religious prepossessions, in order to gain party advantage. The pernicious character of such party tactics is readily apparent. Passions and prejudices are by this means aroused, which are palpably inimical to the letter and spirit of our Government. The framers of the Constitution, as we have seen, took an especial care to exclude questions of religion from the arena of our national politics; and this wise example all the States of the Union have followed. Homogeneity of sentiment, feeling, and aspiration among the people in national concerns is a desideratum yet even more greatly to be prized than such immunity from the complications of Church and State. Hence every agency or influence which tends to unsecularize the State or to keep alive alien memories, alien habits of thought, and alien manners and customs, and thus to retard, weaken, or arrest the process of assimilation, must be looked upon as prejudicial to the country's good. For this reason all such party nomenclature as "the Irish vote," "the German vote," "the Catholic vote," "the Protestant vote," and other like ill-conceived and un-American designations, which

play such a conspicuous part in our "practical politics," is to be sincerely and earnestly deprecated. And for the same reason, the teaching of alien tongues in our public schools, and the introduction and nurturing of societies or orders which have for their object the advancement of alien interests and alien ideas, must be held equally deserving of public reprobation. Principles and measures of government, together with the fitness of men proposed for the public service, and these things only, afford legitimate issues upon which the people may divide and take distinctive party appellations. Race, nativity, or religious belief can have no rightful place in such concerns. "*Is he American?*"—this test satisfies the full measure of American citizenship.

The negro as a political factor presents a problem by no means so easy of solution. Mr. Freeman, in his *Impressions of the United States*, well remarks that our complications from our unassimilated white population, some of which he comments upon, are "not likely to last forever." The Caucasian accretions from foreign sources, after a generation or two, become completely absorbed and lost sight of in the native stock, and so cease to be subjects of separate or special national interest. Not so

with the negro difficulty. This, the same writer maintains, "must last, either till the way has been found out by which the Ethiopian may change his skin, or till either the white man or the black departs out of the land. The United States — and, in their measure, other parts of the American continent and islands — have to grapple with a problem such as no other people ever had to grapple with before. Other communities, from the beginning of political society, have been either avowedly or practically founded on distinctions of race. There has been, to say the least, some people or nation or tribe which has given its character to the whole body, and by which other elements have been assimilated. In the United States this part has been played, as far as the white population is concerned, by the original English kernel. Round that kernel the foreign elements have grown; it assimilates them; they do not assimilate it. But beyond that range lies another range where assimilation ceases to be possible. The eternal laws of nature, the eternal distinction of color, forbid the assimilation of the negro. You may give him the rights of citizenship by law; you cannot make him the real equal, the real fellow, of citizens of European descent. Never before in our world, the

world of Rome, and all that Rome has influenced, has such an experiment been tried. And this, though in some ages of the Roman dominion the adoption and assimilation of men of other races was carried to the extremest point that the laws of nature would allow."

The man that you cannot make "the real equal, the real fellow," of the Anglo-Saxon; you cannot make a "real" American citizen. You will lack that homogeneity of character, that intercourse, that compatibility of temper which are essential to a cohesive, symmetrical, well-balanced society. In the days of slavery it was urged that the nation could not "endure permanently, half slave and half free." All would become "one thing or the other." It is now maintained, perhaps with equal propriety, that the nation can not endure permanently, with a constituency part white and part black. Certain it is, at least, that the breach between the two races in every walk of life, public or private, is growing wider and wider day by day,* and from present appearances there is little prospect that the situation in

* Tourgee's *An Appeal to Caesar*: "Every possible influence affecting each of the races tends toward separation and isolation. The black, as a man, is further away from the white than he was at the close of the war. The separateness of feeling, sentiment,

this respect is ever to improve. These facts explain, in part at least, why the blacks of the South, and to some less extent the blacks of the North, so largely hold their votes as merchandise to be sold to the highest bidder. Everywhere shut out, as they are, from the honors and emoluments of office, and from fellowship of every kind with the dominant race, they can take little real interest in the political concerns of the nation. The abolition of slavery did not, it thus appears, rid us of the old-time "irrepressible conflict"; it only altered its form and direction; in which circumstance we have another striking exemplification of the utter futility of attempting by paper decrees to evade or abrogate the eternal laws of nature.

The "distinction of color" is not the only difficulty that bars the way of the negro to political recognition. The opinion is rapidly gaining ground among thinking and observing persons that he is "totally unfitted for self-government and incapable as a people of making any progress

and interest is greater than it was upon the day that emancipation took effect. This tendency toward a separate crystallization of interest, feeling, and action, as we have already demonstrated, must in all economic and social aspects grow stronger and more marked with each succeeding year." See also *An Appeal to Pharoah*, and Senator J. J. Ingalls, *Cong. Rec.*, Jan. 24, 1890.

whatever.”* We know that in his aboriginal home he has never advanced beyond the lower stages of savagery. In the New World, with the example of the whites before him, he has, indeed, made more or less progress; but as such advantages are withdrawn the original barbarous African nature tends unmistakably to reassert itself. This tendency in greater or less degree is observable among the black of our Southern States. It appears most lamentably conspicuous, however, in Hayti, the model Black Republic, where more than anywhere else outside of his native African jungles, the negro has been left free to carve out an independent destiny for himself. Here his failure stands out as humiliating as it is palpable. Through the enterprise and fostering care of the European there grew up in this island — so history tells us — perhaps the wealthiest and most prosperous colonial province in the world; but with the advent of negro rule (1804) there set in an era of general decadence,

* Lamentable and startling proof to this effect is given in Sir Spencer St. John's *Hayti or The Black Republic* and in Froude's *The English in the West Indies*. The author of the one was the resident British minister in Hayti for many years, and the author of the other made a personal visit to the West Indies a few years ago specially to study British interests in that quarter. Both were, therefore, fully qualified witnesses in the premises.

which ever since has been growing from bad to worse until civilization has well-nigh fled the land. Even Voudouism, with its horrid rites of child-sacrifice and cannibalism, has fast reappeared, and is now so rampant as more or less to dominate and poison the whole society.

The Mongolian race is perhaps a little less objectionable than the African because ethnically a little less remote from the Caucasian. But the Mongolian, unlike the African, is denied the privileges of our citizenship. Besides, those of the former race now among us do not propagate their kind, while reinforcement by immigration in their case is by law strictly inhibited. So if these conditions continue, embarrassments from this source will gradually — indeed rapidly — disappear. That the restrictions and inhibitions imposed upon the yellow man should be kept up and rigorously enforced is, however, a duty palpably manifest, from the fact that he, no less than the black man, appears wholly unfitted for our progressive civilization. The first has stood stone-still in the world's history for more than two thousand years, while the second has of himself never been able to get beyond his breech-clout, his snake-worship, and his man-eating. As is pointed out in a recent work of wide and

intelligent research, we are compelled to accept the fact "that all the savage tribes of the earth belong to the Negro or the Mongolian race. No Negro civilization has ever appeared. No Mongolian one has ever greatly developed. On the other hand, the Caucasian is pre-eminently the man of civilization. No traveller or historian records a savage tribe of Caucasian stock. This race everywhere enters history in a state of advanced barbarism or of rapidly advancing civilization." * As to the type of race which has proved itself capable of sustained progress, the same author advances the following plausible theory: The practical faculty is a characteristic of the fair whites of the North, and the imaginative faculty a characteristic of the dark whites of the South. "It is to the mingling of South and North, of fair and dark, of judgment and emotion, of

* The latest and most plausible theory of ethnical classification is that of "racial color." It is thus stated by Hon. C. H. Reeve in *The South Bend Times*, Sept. 27, 1889: "If the color of the skin and hair and eyes is fixed, single, unchanging, so is the brain power. If the color is variable, complex and changeable, so is the brain power. The less changeable, the less brain power. The more variable, the more brain power. . . . The Indian has more power than the Negro. The Maylayan more power than the Indian. The Chinese more power than either. The white race alone has the power of steady continued progress. It alone has the variableness in color of skin, hair, eyes, and the texture that indicates the highest brain power."

imagination and reason, that we owe . . . the apex of human development, and the culminating point in the long-continued evolution of man." This blending of qualities is found to be the most perfect in the Anglo-Saxon, and to this race therefore is awarded pre-eminence in the faculty for progress.

Admitting, then, that we have in this race-problem a serious difficulty on our hands, what remedy if any have we to propose? The negro is by constitutional provision made the equal of the white man before the law and at the ballot-box. How are we to maintain the high standard of our institutions with such an alleged inferior element having equal voice in their direction? We may answer that no exact prescription can be laid down to fit the whole case. A recognition of first principles, however, is a start in the right direction. The preservation of public order is the primary consideration to be looked to in the premises. This can be done only through the recognition of the virtue and intelligence of the community as the ruling power of the State.*

* "To say that the superior race shall not by its superior knowledge and virtue rule the inferior, is to say that weakness shall control strength, that ignorance and vice shall control knowledge and virtue. To attempt by legislation to place ignorance and vice

Especially should this be so, where, as in the present case the lines of cleavage in the electoral constituency are horizontal and not vertical. Upon no other principle can our civilization be perpetuated and republican liberty be preserved. After recognizing this principle as fundamental, we may hope that the factors in the problem will tend to solve themselves. Tentative measures conceived in the spirit of "reason, justice and truth" will find out the way. Meantime the better policy to pursue would appear to be to relegate the problem for adjustment to the communities most interested, where the people are best acquainted with its conditions, and therefore best qualified to find the proper solution, and where the workings of any measures looking to such solution can be the better observed; the nation at the same time seeing to it that the constitutional guarantee of a "republican form of government" "in every state" shall be sacredly

in control of knowledge and virtue because of the superior numbers of the ignorant, would be to enact that the civilization of great races shall not enjoy the power and influence with which God has endowed them; that three weak men, however ignorant and debased, shall forever control two whites, however wise and virtuous. The mere statement of the proposition shows that it is hostile to the highest natural and moral laws which have been impressed upon man and constitute the basis of his civilization."—Senator Z. B. Vance, *Cong. Rec.*, Jan. 31, 1890.

maintained. The method prescribed may not in a certain sense appear strictly to comport with such guarantee. Not to recognize the right of an ignorant, incompetent, distrusted majority to rule may be seemingly anti-republican; but it is surely not more so in spirit than was the policy that would force the people of a State back into the Union, after such people had unquestionably determined to go out. In either case the well-being of the society is the ultimate issue involved, and certainly no one at this day will deny that the power of self-preservation is in every such event the all-paramount end to be considered. In applying the method presented to the problem in hand, no exercise of violence — no “shot-gun” policy — need be contemplated. It is but nature’s law that the morally and intellectually strong guide the morally and intellectually weak, however great the disparity between them physically.* It is so as between man and the

* The holding of the Pan-American Congress is a significant straw indicating the general drifting of the current in this direction. The utterances at the last banquet of the American Bar Association as reported in the Chicago *Inter-Ocean* of August 31, 1889, show the sentiment and spirit of the Bar upon the same point, as reflected by the subjoined remarks of Judge Cooley on that occasion: “While order has been gradually strengthening and perfecting under a regular administration of law in every country of Christendom, something like a code of laws for the

brute; it is so as between man and man. In the absence of extraneous irritating causes, therefore, we may reasonably hope that the complications we have been considering will in time gradually and peacefully reach a fair and acceptable adjustment.

determination of international questions has been coming into existence. It has come to be perceived that the rules of right and justice that are applicable to individuals are equally applicable to the aggregations of individuals which we know as nations; and usages have grown up and treaties been entered into which have determined under an infinite variety of circumstances how these rules shall be applied in preserving the peace of the world. Whether a code shall not be agreed upon and promulgated by the common consent of nations is now one of the living questions of the day, and it seems not improbable that in the near future there will be such a code, as comprehensive for all practical purposes as those which are established for municipal government."

**THE ANGLO-SAXON AND MANIFEST
DESTINY**

XI.

THE ANGLO-SAXON AND MANIFEST DESTINY.

WE have referred to the rapid spread of the white man over the globe, and to the leadership and increasing dominance of the Anglo-Saxon in the race for universal empire. It remains to inquire what part the American Republic is destined to play in this mighty drama of the nations. Mr. Froude has helped us in some degree to give answer to this query. After much special study of the problem and extensive personal observation, he has asserted it as his deliberate conviction "that the English-speaking people will drift into a union of some kind. If they do not choose England as their centre, they will eventually choose America." This distinguished historian and publicist is by no means a democratic enthusiast; rather the very reverse; but the significant signs of the times have forced him to this conclusion. Nor is he alone in this belief. The subject has of late evoked much learned discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. But in the American view, and in the view apparently of the logic of events, if such "union"

is to take place "it is America which has set the example and indicated the method." Several suggestive facts may be adduced which would seem amply to warrant the assertion of such claim.

In the first place, it is plain that the British colonies are in no temper to submit to any scheme of "union" which may savor at all of monarchy. Being practically democratic and self-governing, made up chiefly of the great middle class, free from hereditary castes, and instinctively repugnant to the transplanting of such obnoxious exotics among them, they offer a congenial and prolific soil for the growth and spread of republican principles and institutions. Thus are they all the while growing away from the parent country. Every scheme yet proposed for lessening the breach and strengthening the ties of nationality has met with insuperable objection. It is plainly seen that the centrifugal forces now at work are bound sooner or later to snap asunder the last remaining cord that binds the parent and offspring together. In the present instance, the circumstances tending towards such result are decidedly stronger and the inducements far greater than were the influences which led to the great revolt in America a century and more ago.

The Stamp-Act was seized upon as the occasion for the severing of our allegiance from the mother country, and it may take a less pretext in the present case to set the ball rolling. When the crisis does come, as to all appearances come it must, it is "at least possible"—says the same authority speaking as an Englishman from an English point of view—that the disaffected communities "may apply for admittance to the American Union; and it is equally possible that the Americans may not refuse. Canada they (the Americans) already calculate on as a certainty. Why may not the Cape and Australia and New Zealand follow? The American citizen is a more considerable person in the world than a member of the independent republic of Cape Town or Natal; and should the colonists take this view of their interests, and should the Americans encourage them, what kind of future would lie before England? Our very existence as a nation would soon depend upon the clemency of the Power which would have finally taken the lead from us among the English-speaking races. If Australia and the Cape were American we could not hold India, except at the Americans' pleasure. Our commerce would be equally at their mercy, and the best prospects

for us would be to be one day swept up into the train of the same grand confederacy." True, these utterances were written about two decades ago, but the author repeats substantially the same views in his *Oceana*, which work was issued but five years since (in 1885), after he had made the tour round the world, visiting en route all the principal colonies. The drift of sentiment in the colonies is at present undoubtedly toward independence. In Canada the project of annexation to the United States has gained some foot-hold; but the route to such consummation is much more likely to lie through the intermediate station of independence. What more natural and matter-of-fact in such event than that the peoples which are so closely allied to us in all the elements that make up a homogeneous nationality should, especially under pressure of the present tendency to large political aggregations, seek to cast their fortunes with the American Union — that nation which, according to Mr. Froude has "solved, and solved completely," "the problem of how to combine a number of self-governing communities into a single commonwealth?"

At the same time that we are watching this leaven of democracy thus working out its results

among the Anglo-Saxon peoples wherever located, we cannot fail to notice that other branches of Indo-Europeans are gradually but steadily yielding to the same softening and liberalizing influences. The Latin and Teutonic states of Europe are unmistakably drifting in this direction, and even Slavonic Russia, deeply-dyed in despotism as she is, is showing increasing symptoms of a like leaven working at her core. It can be only a question of time when she too must give way to the increasing pressure of advancing civilization. For after all, is not her dominant race, the Slav, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh? Thus will all the non-Asiatic branches of the ancient Aryan family again be brought together upon a common plane and fitted to pursue a common destiny.

Another reason presents itself why the United States may claim the leadership of the English speaking races. Says Dr. Strong in his powerful essay on *The Anglo-Saxon and the World's Future*: "There can be no reasonable doubt that North America is to be the great home of the Anglo-Saxon, the principal seat of his power, the center of his life and influence. Not only does it constitute seven-elevenths of his

possessions, but his empire is unsevered, while the remaining four-elevenths are fragmentary and scattered over the earth. Australia will have a great population; but its disadvantages, as compared with North America, are too manifest to need mention. Our continent has room and resources and climate, it lies in the pathway of the nations, it belongs to the zone of power, and already, among Anglo-Saxons, do we lead in population and wealth." Though a part of the great Anglo-Saxon family, we yet have evolved a distinctive type of individuality — a type strong, energetic, self assertive; one which readily impresses itself upon all kindred ethnic elements with which it comes in contact. Thus, with the help of such assimilating accretions from abroad, our population, as the same writer shows, has doubled since the beginning of the last century, on the average, once in every twenty-five years. Our increase in territory has even more than kept pace with our increase in population; so that to-day, with a national domain well-nigh as large as the entire continent of Europe, we comprise (to borrow the words of Sir Henry Maine) "the most multitudinous and homogeneous population in the world." But our unoccupied lands are rapidly filling up, and when

pressure from this cause begins to be felt, it is hardly probable that Yankee genius and Yankee grit would be content long to remain cooped up within the country's present metes and bounds. More probable is it, that the restive, indomitable Yankee spirit which has thus carried the nation forward in its phenomenal career, is destined to move onward in its imposing majesty in whatever direction and to whatever extent new fields for enterprise and achievement shall invite occupancy and development. The Yankee flag will inevitably follow Yankee destiny. In a word, it is only when the American plan — the plan of a federal republic — shall have become world-embracing that the cherished dreams of "manifest destiny" will have become fully realized. The natural forces of material and intellectual evolution are gradually, silently, surely tending to that end. The tendency of society to industrial, social and political co-operation, and of industrial and intellectual development to the growth of popular ideas and institutions, are among the healthful, hopeful signs pointing in the direction indicated.

Montesquieu, whose politico - philosophical speculations profoundly influenced the liberal thought of the latter part of the last (18th)

century, laid down the doctrine that republican government was practicable only as applied to small communities. But the framers of our Federal Constitution thought otherwise, as did the keen, clear-sighted writers in *The Federalist*. Federation united with representation and local self-government was conceived by the founders of our Government as embodying the true polity for such a people as ours, and experience thus far has certainly amply demonstrated their sagacity in so doing. With our forty-two States and sixty millions of people, the nation is working under this triune system in all its parts and in all its relations with the minimum of friction perhaps possible under present conditions in organized society. The conviction, too, is becoming more and more current, that, if the optimistic dream of the "brotherhood of man" is ever to be realized politically in the birth of a universal nation, this same triune principle embraces in itself all the conditions requisite to the successful working out of such destiny. Nor is such an ambitious conception to be pooh-poohed as an empty chimera. Obviously, the thoughts of men are widening with the process of the suns. The rapid increase of the means of intercourse among nations is necessarily tending to bring

about the result indicated. Our interests and our habits of thought, under such stimulus, are fast becoming more enlarged, more cosmopolitan. We are already drawing upon the four quarters of the globe in order to satisfy our multiplying tastes, necessities, and desires. Under such circumstances, it is impossible that a community of feeling, sentiment, and method should not spring up. Accordingly, we note that broader and more enlightened views of international law and comity are steadily developing. Commissions and arbitration as methods of adjusting international entanglements are growing more and more in general favor and acceptance. And as such tendency toward social and material homogeneity increases, the range of jurisdiction of such international tribunals would naturally undergo a corresponding augmentation, and would as a consequence eventually develop into a permanent "court of envoys," or the so-called "parliament of man." There seems, indeed, to be little room for doubt that this liberal, cosmopolitan spirit will become stronger and stronger as its advantages become more and more clearly discerned, till some day disputes among nations, as disputes now among the several States of our Union and among individuals, will come

universally to be "settled by legal argument and judicial decision, and not by wager of battle." Professor Fiske, in his admirable lecture on "Manifest Destiny," has told us in clearest, tersest phrase how this desideratum is logically to come about. "The history of human progress politically will," in his view, "continue to be in the future what it has been in the past,—the history of the union of successive groups of men into larger and more complex aggregates. As this process goes on, it may after many more ages of political experience become apparent that there is really no reason, in the nature of things, why the whole of mankind should not constitute politically one huge federation, each little group managing its local affairs in entire independence, but relegating all questions of international interest to the decision of one central tribunal supported by the public opinion of the entire human race." Thus "The American Idea," which we have been trying throughout these pages in some measure to illustrate, will have become expanded and ripened so as to embrace all humanity within its scope, and thenceforth to help carry forward the interests of civilization so far as political agency can be made to contribute to such end. We conclude,

therefore, that viewing our lot in the light of universal history, we of this Republic have little reasonable ground to complain of our country, our age, or the prospects which appear to lie before us.

THE END.

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